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Abstract
In the 1940s and 1950s poor air quality in major metropolitan areas throughout the United States
started to negatively influence the health of citizens throughout the country. After numerous
studies the government concluded that mobile sources of air pollution were a significant
contributor to the deteriorating air quality. From that point onwards, the automobile
manufacturers have been forced to comply with ever tightening emission regulations. This thesis
describes an original investigation into the conflicting clockspeeds that prohibit rapid integration
of new automobile emission technologies into production automobiles. Common themes and
barriers to technology implementation are uncovered by systematically analyzing current
production emission technology and exhaust gas after-treatment systems, and investigating how
those systems have evolved over the years.
A heuristic for analyzing the technology clockspeed is developed by decomposing the problem
into four interconnected cycles. These four cycles correspond to the government's process to
develop new automobile emission control regulations and the automobile manufacturer's ability
to engineer and certify vehicle platforms, engines, and combustion after-treatment systems. This
thesis analyzes the emission control technology development process in six chapters. The first
chapter deals with setting the scope and defining the boundaries of the systems that will be
analyzed. Chapter two analyzes the driving forces behind the creation of emission regulations
and the legislative processes that transform ideas into law. Chapter three analyzes the second
level decomposition of the problem at the vehicle level with a specific emphasis on Ford Motor
Company's Fox vehicle platform. The fourth chapter decomposes the problem to the engine
system level with a focus on the production history of American V8 engines. Chapter five
investigates the management of a catalytic converter development program and recommends an
organizational structure to efficiently develop catalytic converter systems. The organizational
structure recommendation is based on results obtained from a task oriented design structure
matrix and a system engineering decomposition.
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Chapter 1- Introduction and Scope
The first step in performing a system engineering and system architecture analysis is to
determine the scope of the problem. In order to set the scope, however, a common
understanding of the problem is needed along with a common vocabulary that all participants
can understand and speak knowledgeably about. To begin this investigation regarding the
difficulties of developing and implementing automobile emission control technologies, one
must first create a systems oriented vocabulary custom tailored to this problem.
The first definition that must be agreed upon is the definition of a system. Mark Maier and
Eberhardt Rechtin, in their book entitled The Art of Systems Architecting, define a system in
the following manner:
"System: a set of different elements so connected or related as
to perform a unique function not performable by the elements
alone."'
Using this definition of a system, it is easy to make the connections that, for example, an
engine is a system because components such as pistons, connecting rods, a crankshaft, and
sparkplugs, when combined to form an engine, perform the unique function of generating
rotational motion. The combined function of the engine is thus a function that none of the
individual components could perform on its own. Incidentally, in Maier and Rechtin's
system definition, the word "component" could also be substituted for the word "element".
This system definition does an excellent job describing physical items that mankind has
created. This definition can easily be used to perform functional zooming in order to
decompose the system into subsystems and sub-subsystems. For example, a piston, by itself
could be considered a small system because in it's design it has a surface to react the forces
of combustion with, a skirt to guide the piston in it's up and down travel, and a bore to allow
for rotation of the connecting rod. However, the functional zooming does not necessarily
stop there. A physicist might keep zooming until atoms, quarks, and strings enter into the
equation. This atomic and subatomic level of functional zooming is not compatible with this
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previously mentioned definition for a system because it violates the next definition, the
definition for a component.
For this paper, the lower boundary of the functional zooming is considered to be the
component level. This fact leads us to the second definition. The definition for a component
has been obtained from some work developed by Professor Edward Crawley:
"Component: an element within a system that cannot be taken
apart without destroying its ability to deliver its function"2
Now that the lower bounds of the system have been established at the component level, some
effort must be spent defining the upper bounds of the system. Essentially the question
becomes, where is the upper bound of the national air pollution control system since it is this
system that is analyzed in this thesis. Certainly intergalactic forces do not play a significant
role in the automobile emissions technology implementation process. On the other hand,
large abstract systems, such as governmental policy, definitely impact the national air
pollution system.
When one tries to apply Maier and Rechtin's definition of a system to a large-scale
environmental problem, for instance, national air pollution, the system is so large with so
many interactions that it becomes very difficult to determine how the elements are connected
or how each subsystem reacts with one another. A review of literature found that J. Clarence
Davies had described the national air quality system as being an interrelated whole3 . This
classification of the air quality system proved to be both difficult to place bounds on, and
difficult to conceptually diagram. To overcome the difficulty in placing an upper bound on a
large abstract system, a new term is needed. The term that will be used throughout this thesis
to define the upper systems boundary is megasystem boundary, which is defined below:
Megasystem boundary: the outermost boundary in a systems
analysis. Items outside the boundary have no appreciable
effect on the performance of the system while items inside the
boundary significantly affect system performance
The fourth definition that needs clarification relates to changes in industry and the business
climate that occur over time. The term that Professor Charles Fine uses to describe these
changes is industry clockspeed4 .
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Industry clockspeed: the rate of evolution of an industry that
predominantly depends on its product clockspeed, process
clockspeed and organizational clockspeed
Now that there is a commonly understood vocabulary for systems analysis, the bounds of the
systems engineering problem can be graphical represented. As mentioned previously, the
conflicts that are analyzed in detail in this thesis relate to the conflicting systemic
clockspeeds that prevent the rapid implementation of new automobile emission control
technologies. The boundary diagram below outlines the portion of the national air quality
megasystem that will be analyzed in this thesis.
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This procedure for determining the scope of the problem is elegant because there is few
emission sources that jump the boundary of the thesis scope yet still impact national air
quality. These few boundary-jumping interactions will be briefly touched upon here. The
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category of stationary sources of emissions contains power plants and other industry and
manufacturing facilities. The scale of the emissions and of the emissions control technology
that is present on these plants and facilities is of a completely different magnitude than the
emission control technology in automobiles, and thus the stationary sources of emissions
operate under different emission rules and will be excluded from this thesis. Additionally,
the purpose of heavy trucks and industrial trucks is to move large quantities of goods
between two places (in contrast, automobiles move small quantities of people and goods
between two places), and thus heavy trucks operate under a completely different duty cycle
that allows them to operate under different emission rules. Since the heavy trucks operate
under different emission rules than automobiles operate under, they will not be analyzed in
detail in this thesis. The same logic applies to aircraft and watercraft, and thus those forms of
transportation will not be analyzed in this thesis.
Now that a common vocabulary has been developed, and the boundary of the system has
been created, a methodic investigation into the emission control technology development
process can be performed. This analysis will be accomplished by decomposing the problem
into four segments. The first segment is the automobile emission regulation creation process
consisting of the citizens of the United States, and the various governing bodies and
legislative branches of government. In this analysis, the driving factors behind emission
regulation creation are determined. The second segment deals with vehicle platform
development constraints and how vehicle platforms can adapt over time to changing emission
regulations. The third segment drills down into the engine systems level to analyze how
engine technologies have changed over time in response to emission regulations and
changing customer demands. The fourth and final segment analyzes exhaust catalytic
converters and how these systems have evolved over time.
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Chapter 2- Government Regulations Development
In Charles H. Fine's book, Clockspeed, a framework for analyzing industry innovation is
described. In that framework, Fine characterizes the innovation cycles as being governed by
three interrelated cycles: the product cycle, the process cycle, and the organizational cycle.
A lifecycle analysis of the air quality legislative process would not be complete unless it took
account for these three cycles. In this chapter, the air quality legislative history is laid out.
This history review is followed up with a discussion regarding the importance of lead users
and their impact on the innovation cycles. After the lead user discussions, the applicability
and importance of each of the three innovation cycles: product, process, and organization, are
analyzed. Following the cycle discussions, a conclusion section ties this chapter on air
quality legislation together and uses the lessons of clockspeed analysis to investigate the
failure of the California Zero Emission Vehicle mandates.
Emissions History
Regulations regarding emissions for passenger cars have been a part of the United States
automobile industry since the 1960s. In order to understand the driving forces behind the
legislation, one must appreciate the state of the environment and the public's awareness of the
environment in the 1940s through the 1970s. Four data points that show the increasing
problem of deteriorating air quality in the United States and how the public reacted to the
concern on this issue are as follows:
1. The California Air Resource Board notes that in 1943 the first episodes
of smog occur in the Los Angeles area, resulting in respiratory
discomfort of a number of citizens
2. Twenty deaths and roughly 6000 illnesses are attributed to air pollution
in Donora Pennsylvania in 1948 .
3. A review of popular culture literature shows that the 1962 book Silent
Spring awakened the public to the dangers of pollution. This book dealt
with humankind's impact on nature and is quoted as being a major
catalyst that started the environmental movement.
4. Over 20 million Feople participate in the first Earth Day Celebration on
April 22 in 1970.
The public began to demand legislative action to combat the air pollution problem, and the
legislators responded by making environmental action a top priority. The 1955 Air Quality
Control Act was the Federal governments first legislative action on the subject. In efforts to
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further control air pollution, the Air Quality Act of 1967 was created. The 1967 act made air
pollution a regional problem by giving individual states the responsibility for creating air
quality regions. By 1970, the states had failed to create the expected numbers of air quality
regions and lawmakers realized that the statute had no effective means of enforcement. In
January 1 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). In December of 1970, the Environmental Protection Agency was founded and the
1970 Clean Air Act Amendments were signed.
The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act are a complex series of document that deals with
several industries in order to improve the air quality throughout the United States. The
Clean Air Act targeted three principle constituents of air pollution- oxides of nitrogen (NOx),
carbon monoxide (CO) and volatile organic compounds (VOC). The Clean Air Act greatly
impacted the automobile industry because the Act created strict limits and set timetables as to
when tailpipe emissions had to be reduced. Effective as of 1975, cars and light duty trucks
had to emit less than 3.1 grams per mile of NOx emissions. It was this legislation that forced
automakers to develop cleaner running vehicles for the entire nation and put catalytic
converters on 1975 model year passenger cars in North America.
The 1970 Clean Air Act amendments established timetables for automobile manufacturers to
reduce tailpipe emissions. 1975 model year vehicles had to comply with strict carbon
monoxide, nitrogen oxide, and volatile organic compound emissions limits9 . Tailpipe
emissions were not the only items affected by the 1970 amendments. The lawmakers
recognized some of the intricacies of the automobile industry and thus they did not only
enact tailpipe emission legislation, but the EPA also set automobile maintenance regulations
that put warning devices in the vehicles so that owners would be alerted to emission issues
with their vehicle. In addition, useful lives of automobiles and their components were
specified. According to the legislation, a vehicle could have its catalyst changed once and its
EGR system serviced three times if the emissions warning device indicated a problem during
the 50,000 mile useful life of a vehicle'0 . These permissible service operations were in
addition to the normal 12,500-mile tune-up intervals that were standard during those times.
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Since the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, there has been a continued
adoption of stricter and stricter tailpipe emission standards. Key pieces of federal legislation
were also passed in 1977, 1990, and 1999. A summary of the federal NOx standards over
time is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2- NOx Emission Standards of Time
Emission Standards over Time
1975 1977 1981 1994 1999 2004
Passenger Car NOx (g/mi) 3.1 2 1 0.6 0.3 0.07
Light Truck NOx (g/mi) 3.1 2.3 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.07
Source: EPA Emission Facts- The History of Reducing Tailpipe Emissions, May 1999
An important point to consider is that there is always a time delay or implementation
schedule between when a final ruling on an emissions change is made, and when
manufacturers have to implement that technology. Figure 3 highlights the time delay
associated with each of the pieces of legislation. This time delay is very important when
discussions regarding clockspeed occur later on in the chapter. There is not a one to one
mapping between the dates in figure 2 and the dates shown in figure 3 because the 1994
legislation included an incremental emissions change in 1999.
Figure 3- Legislation Overview
Legislation date Legislation Name Implementation Date Time Delay
1961 California PCV Mandate 1963 2 years
1963 California Pollution Control Board 1966 3 years
1965 Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act 1968 3 years
1970 Clean Air Act Amendment 1975 5 year
1977 Clean Air Act Amendment 1981 3 year
1990 Tier 1 Standards 1994 4 year
1999 Tier 2 Standards 2004 5 year
Source: EPA Emission Facts- The History of Reducing Tailpipe Emissions, May 1999
Lead Users and Early Adopters
In order to analyze the processes used to create legislation, it is most effective to analyze the
legislative body that has the fastest rate of process or product evolution. For the case of air
pollution legislation, the fastest clockspeed organization is definitely the California Air
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Resource Board. The California lawmakers enacted legislation in 195911 to establish air
quality standards. Recalling that the legislation comes from lawmakers who are elected
based on the majority of the citizens, the government that established the 1959 California
legislation was put into office in the mid 1950s. The first standard that was set targeted
hydrocarbon crankcase ventilation emissions. In 1961, crankcase emission laws were
enacted that had implementation timing that went into effect in 1963 for vehicles for sale in
California. Thus, only two years after the need for a standard was identified, a standard was
set, and two years after the standard was set, an emissions solution was implemented. That is
a remarkably rapid implementation plan for both the automotive industry and the legislature.
In contrast to California's rapid response to citizen's demands for cleaner air, the Federal
government was much slower to react. Congress' first course of action was the 1955 Air
Pollution Control Act, an Act that did nothing to create standards, but just identified air
pollution as a national problem and provided research money to investigate the problem. The
1963 Federal Clean Air Act enacted standards for stationary pollution sources, but it wasn't
until the 1965 Clean Air Act Amendments that the Federal Government legislated nationwide
automotive tailpipe emission standards, and then the automakers had to react quickly because
those standards were enacted with breathtaking speed for the 1968 model year. Fortunately
for the manufacturer's sake, the Federal emission standards mirrored the California standards.
Essentially the federal government took eight years from when it identified a problem, to
when emission regulations took effect for stationary emission sources, and ten years for
mobile source emissions to be determined. That ten-year time frame is just for the regulation
to be enacted; it does not include the implementation timeline. Nationwide, the 1968 model
year vehicles had to comply with the 1965 Federal Clean Air Act Amendments. This timing
means that it took 13 years at the national level to go from problem identification to solution
implementation.
Product Cycle Analysis
At the Federal level, the outcomes of the air pollution legislation are the various Acts. The
key legislative actions, or to put it into business terms, products, are as follows:
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Figure 4- Air Pollution Legislation Goals
Year Act Goal
1955 Federal Air Pollution Control Act Organized research to understand air
1963 Clean Air Act Established limits for stationary source air
pollution
1965 Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act Establish Nationwide limits for automobile
tailpipe pollution
1970 Clean Air Act Amendment Comprehensive revision, stricter standards
across the board, EPA responsible for
national air pollution
1977 Clean Air Act Amendment Modification of requirements, and adjustment
of compliance timing
1990 Clean Air Act Amendment, Tier 1 Stricter requirements, higher durability limits,
Standards new evaporative emissions and refueling
vapor control requirments
1999 Tier 2 Tailpipe Emission Standards Stricter requirements, light duty truck and car
NOx standards commonized
These legislative products had dramatic effects on the performance of the automobile and it's
emission systems. Frequently the rates of technological development and performance of
products can be compared to an "S" curve. This curve graphs product performance over
time. The shape of the "S" curve follows typical industry innovation cycles where early on
in a product's life, innovation is slow, and performance of the product is minimal. The slow
period of automobile emissions development can be considered the pre 1965 era. The 1965
Clean Air Act and the 1970 Amendments kicked the automobile industry into technological
action and forced a rapid development of emission technology. This rapid development of
technology led to a dramatic increase in the performance of the product. After a period of
time, however, the rapid innovation cycle slows down, and the product enters the phase of its
life when product performance marginally improves. This mature phase of the technology
development cycle occurred after 1990. The three phases of this cycle have been called the
fluid phase (since typical examples have architectures that are still changing), transitional
phase and specific phase'.
If one views NOx automobile emissions as the performance criteria for automobile
emissions, that performance criteria can be graphed over time to illustrate how the
government regulation process drove technological development. Figure 5 illustrates these
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three stages of innovation and how the NOx emissions performance of automobiles has
dramatically improved. An idealized "S" curve is also shown on the figure.
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Two main points need to be made regarding this graph. First off, the graph depicts the NOx
standards as outlined in the various federal acts. Secondly, the NOx reduction limit as shown
appears to be 100%. Common thinking would dictate that once 100% of the NOx pollution
has been eliminated from automobile tailpipe emissions, there would be no further
technological progress needed. This is not necessarily the case. Why can't automobiles clean
the air? There has been one automaker that has successfully challenged the mindset that
automobiles can't clean the air. Volvo Corporation currently offers the public a system called
PremAir that consists of a radiator coated with a catalyst that converts ozone to diatomic
oxygen as the vehicle is driven. According to Volvo Press Releases' 3 this PremAir system
can convert into oxygen 75% of the ozone that flows through a radiator. This is a brilliant
example that illustrates that even though gigantic steps have been made to improve
automobile NOx emissions, the role of the government and the automakers is far from
complete when it comes to enacting automotive emission legislation and developing
emission technologies. There are still potential breakthroughs that have yet to be discovered,
and legislative bodies need to keep pushing the industry to develop these technologies.
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To gain additional insight into industry product cycle analysis, the book Clockspeed 4
recommends an analysis of extremely rapid and fast changing segments of a particular
industry. The term that was coined to describe these segments and lessons was industrial
fruitflies15 since fruit flies allow biologists to quickly study the effects of changes on
hundreds of generations of flies in a short amount of time. Using this definition as a guide,
the question becomes, where are the industrial fruit flies of the automobile regulation
industry and what can that industry segment teach us?
Figure 3 showed how the clockspeed of the regulation process started out with a two-year
time delay in 1961, and over time as the vehicles have become more complex and emission
regulations have become more stringent, the time delay has extended to five years. A five-
year time delay is definitely not characteristic of the fruit fly of the industry. The question
then becomes, in today's complex industry, can automobile regulation be adopted and
implemented more quickly?
An examination of some recent changes in safety standards reveals where the fruit flies of the
automobile regulation industry can be found. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 138 deals with tire pressure monitoring systems. The adoption of the
Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act (TREAD Act)
of 2000 called for an under-inflated tire warning system to be placed on vehicles. On June 5,
2002, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration published a final rule regarding
FMVSS 13816. The text of that rule specified that 10% of a manufacturer's vehicles
manufactured between November 1, 2003 and October 31, 2004 must be equipped with an
approved tire pressure monitoring system. In summary, government regulators took two
years to develop the FMVSS 138 safety standards, and gave automobile manufacturers 1-2
years to develop and manufacture vehicles that complied with the standards.
With today's technologically complex automobiles, government regulations and standards
can still drive technological advancement into automobiles and force a rapid implementation
of technology within a two-year time frame. The lesson from FMVSS 138 that can be
applied to tailpipe emission control technology is that technological change can be forced
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upon an industry segment, and the product development process of that industry segment
must be flexible and nimble enough to rapidly react to those changes. The next wave of
emission regulations might not allow for a five-year implementation schedule.
Process Cycle Analysis
To analyze the process clockspeed governing the air pollution legislation process, an
investigation into the lawmaking process is required. Fortunately, the base legislative
process has not changed significantly in the last two hundred years. Over time, the process
has become more complicated since there are more committees and support infrastructures
belonging to the government, but fundamentally, the process remains the same. From a very
high level, a member of Congress proposes an idea, and after extensive debates and
subcommittee meetings and hearings, the bill may either be killed, or approved. After Senate
and House approval, the bill is forwarded to the president for approval. The flow chart below
provides an overview of the process that occurs when a member of Congress proposes a bill.
Some of the organizational problems with the government as it pertains to emission
legislation will be covered in the organizational process section of the paper.
Figure 6- Legislation Process Flowchart
Memberof Houseof
Congress Representatives bill is sent to the
proposes bill and and Senate president
debate begins approve bill
House of
Representatives Approved bill Presidentpublishes the law bpoed bill
as the United becomes an Act approves bill
States code
CongressAfter public debate
CutnresS the text of the
aghnrizes Uo Authorized agency regulation is
interpret the code de4termines that* published in the
and create regulation is needed Code of Federal
regultionsRegulations
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The American public, who are also the customers for the automobile industry, have two
primary sources of inputs into this lawmaking process- the election process, and the public
debating process. The public elects members of Congress and other government personnel so
that their core beliefs are represented. The general public is also invited to attend and asked
to participate in debates regarding pending legislation and the latest research results about the
environment and emission technologies. These debate forums happen at both the national
level, (i.e. sponsored by the EPA), and also at the state level (i.e. sponsored by the California
Air Resource Board).
The first step in engineering any solution is the development of appropriate targets. That
sounds easy, but how does one really bridge the gap between politicians elected by citizens
who are concerned with the environment and the regulation of sources of environmental
pollution? The process that the Federal government followed in regards to early emission
legislation illustrates an example of systems engineering. In 1971, the EPA defined
dangerous air pollution so that the states could enact plans to prevent dangerous air pollution.
The EPA's conclusions were as follows:
Figure 7- EPA Air Pollution Danger Level
Pollutant Danger Level
Sulfur dioxide 2620 pgm/m3, 24 hr average
Particulate Matter 1000 pgm/m3 , 24 hr average
Carbon Monoxide 57.5 pgm/m3 , 8 hr average
86.3 pgm/m3 , 4 hr average
144 pgm/m3, 1 hr average
Photochemical oxidants 800 pgm/m3 , 4 hour average
1,200 pgm/m3 , 2 hr average
1,400 pgm/m3 , 1 hr average
Nitrogen dioxide 3750 pgm/m3 , 1 hr average
938 pgm/m3 , 24 hr average
Source: EPA Defines Air Pollution Danger Levels, EPA Press Release- October 19, 1971
The establishment of these danger levels was the first step of the system engineering process.
By quantifying dangerous levels of certain pollutants at the Federal level, the states now had
the daunting task to translate these danger levels into targets that could be cascaded to
various industries. Since numerous industries and numerous chemicals polluted the
environment, individual industry targets and measuring standards had to be developed.
17
Recalling that the systems engineering diagram allows decomposition of the problem into
discrete sections, the following target cascades and system decompositions can be created to
diagram the system interactions within the air quality megasystem.
Figure 8- Air Quality System Engineering Diagram




Target: Improve Air Qualit
System:--------------------------
-EPA Jurisdiction Limits
Target: Develop action plans to
achieve air quality that exceeds
the published danger levels
-State Jurisdiction Limits
Target: NOx and HC limits
-Stationary sources of air pollution (ie factories)
-Mobile sources of air pollution (ie. automobiles)
Once states had danger level targets for pollutants, they still required standardized test
procedures to ensure compliance with those levels. The Federal government and it's agencies
developed those test cycles (i.e. FTP-75 and others) to ensure testing uniformity across all
states.
After reviewing the successes of automobile tailpipe controls, a balanced perspective would
also need to consider some of the regulatory missteps. Recently the California regulators
have had to scale back their most ambitions mandate yet, the Zero Emission Vehicle
mandate. The Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) mandates enacted a timetable that prescribed
how much of a manufacturers fleet of vehicles had to be classified as a Zero Emissions
Vehicle. The original timetable, adopted in 1990, specified that by 2003, 10% of all vehicles
sold in California had to be Zero Emission Vehicles. The plan had a phase-in program
where 2% of a manufacturer's new car sales had to be classified as a ZEV by 1998. The rules
were changed in 1996 with the elimination of the 1998 2% ZEV requirement, but the 10%
172003 ZEV requirement was maintained . In 2001, the requirements were further modified
to allow manufacturers to meet the 10% limit with a combination of ZEV, Advanced
18
18Technology ZEV and Partial Zero Emission Vehicle classifications' . In summary, the ZEV
mandates have forced automobile manufacturers to bring cleaner vehicles to the marketplace.
The California case illustrates that there are limitations as to how fast regulations can try to
increase the clockspeed of technological process. Two of the key factors that were
misjudged by the California lawmakers were the battery performance technology curve and
customer usage profiles. Driving range has always hampered electric vehicles, and since
battery performance did not drastically improve between 1990 and 1999, customers were left
with a significant tradeoff. The buying public in large numbers ended up not opening up
their checkbooks to purchase the electric vehicles because the driving range tradeoffs proved
to be too great of a hurdle to overcome.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that California lawmakers created legislation that was
solution specific. The ZEV mandate originally stated that 10% of all vehicles sold in the
state had to be electric automobiles. A systems engineering approach would have been to
create a solution neutral problem statement instead of a solution specific problem statement.
The revised ZEV mandate that allows PZEV, Advanced Technology ZEV, Hybrid, and
Electric vehicles provides a more solution neutral problem statement.
Organizational Cycle Analysis
The principle drivers of the organizational cycle of the government might originally be
considered to be the election cycles. After all, the outcomes of the elections dictate who is in
office, and thus which political party controls either the State or Federal Legislature. After a
careful review of the composition of the Federal Congress, it was surprising that the approval
of environmental legislation regarding tailpipe emissions appeared to occur independently of
which party, Republican or Democrat, held the majority position. Appendix A contains the
data for the California governors and Presidents of the United States, while Appendix B takes
a more detailed look at which party held the majority status in the United States Senate and
the House of Representatives.
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The six major pieces of federal automobile emission legislation (1955, 1965, 1970, 1977,
1990, and 1999) were enacted under two Democratic presidents, three Republican presidents,
and once when an outgoing Republican president was replaced with an incoming Democratic
president. These legislative acts were also approved five out of six times under Democratic
majority of the House and Senate. However, a counter point that needs to be mentioned is
that for the majority of time since 1953, democrats have held the majority status in both the
Senate and House. Thus it is not surprising that the five out of six times statistic exists.
Since there are only six federal data points to analyze, maybe this analysis needs to be taken
an extra step for a more detailed review, however, it does not appear that the environmental
problems of tailpipe emissions is dominated by federal party politics. Election year
organizational cycles also do not appear to strongly influence the adoption of emission
legislation.
When reviewing California's legislation history, seven significant automobile emissions
related policies have been enacted (1961, 1963, 1970, 1988, 1990, 1996, and 1998). During
five of those years, the state was governed by a Republican governor, and during two of
those years, a Democratic governor governed the state. Historically speaking, between 1953
and 2000, California has been governed for 30 years by Republicans governors and 18 years
by Democratic governors. Thus, once again, it is not surprising that Republican Californian
governors have adopted a greater share of the emission legislations. It appear, that in
California, adoption of automobile emission legislation is not tied to political party majority
status.
One item that definitely impacts the effectiveness of emission legislation is the organization
of the governing body put in charge of enforcing the regulations. In the early 1960s the
burden of investigating and improving air quality was placed on the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare. At that time, this organization had responsibility for administering
all federal environmental protection programs19. This organization had experience
developing national environmental policies because in the 1950's that group had focused on
water quality and workplace air quality legislation. The problem of National air pollution,
when given to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, proved to provide a unique
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set of challenges to that organization. In 1965, that group ended up adopting the California
emission standards effective for vehicles sold in 1968. Unfortunately this organization didn't
have an organizational structure that allowed the enforcement and monitoring for compliance
of this legislation. The organizational structure was soon changed in 1970.
An analysis of the lawmaking process reveals the importance of the creation of the EPA.
Once the House and Senate approved the 1970 Clean Air Act amendments, a US agency was
needed to interpret the code and create regulations. The priorities of the EPA were concisely
outlined in the EPA's founding documents in 1970. Key priorities of the EPA, as defined in
reorganization plan no 3 of 1970 were20:
1. Establishment and enforcements of environmental protection standards
2. Conduct pollution control research
3. Develop and recommend to the president new policies for the protection of the environment
Now that the United States had a ratified Act signed by the president, and an agency
responsible for carrying out the intent of the Act, an organizational structure was established
that had the power to research emissions issues, establish high quality standards, and enforce
the standards.
Chapter 2 Conclusions
There are four key lessons learned by this analysis of the air quality legislative history. The
first lesson is that the legislative process and how the laws are created neatly illustrate the
fundamental principles of systems engineering. The megasystem, consisting of the
environment and the citizens of the United States first identified the problem of deteriorating
air quality. The lawmakers then defined the scope of the problem by analyzing data and
determining that the problem came from five principle pollutants. The problem was then
further decomposed into industry segments, stationary and mobile source emissions, and
specific regulatory limits were enacted against those two types of emissions sources.
The second lesson that has been learned is that California can be classified as the lead user /
early adopter of emissions technology, and the Federal government can be classified as the
late adopter since Federal emission standards typically trail California standards. This means
that California rule makers have historically set the tightest emission standards at an earlier
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point in time than the federal rule makers have. From a technology development standpoint,
the California regulations have a greater effect on the emissions innovation cycle than the
Federal regulations.
The third lesson learned is that there are limits as too how fast government regulations can
push the automobile manufacturers to develop technologies. The California ZEV mandate
roll back is an example where government regulators have pushed the technology bounds too
far. Fortunately, not all automobile regulations suffer from a slow clockspeed development
process. A perfect case in point is the recently adopted changes to FMVSS 138 with regards
to tire pressure monitoring systems. Since this requirement is still new, and the
implementation timing is still occurring, only time can tell if automakers can react to the
aggressive technology hurdles this requirement imposes.
Fourthly, the emission legislation creation process does not appear to be strictly dominated
by political party politics. When considering the various Federal and California state
legislative actions that have been approved, Democratic and Republican leadership have
championed emission legislation in approximately equal frequency. It is comforting to know
that society's need for cleaner air is a need that has been championed by both political parties.
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Chapter 3-Vehicle Platform Development
The previous chapter explored the intricacies of the environmental legislation process as it
pertains to automobile legislation. This high level system, entitled the megasystem due to its
numerous interfaces and complex boundaries, determines the emissions and environmental
rules that must be followed by the automobile industry. The next level decomposition of the
problem takes us from the citizens, environment, and lawmakers level, down to the
automobile manufacturer's level. It is at this system level that automobile manufacturers
must develop a portfolio of products that ultimately meet or better the targets laid out in the
federal and state legislations. This level of decomposition of the problem is called the
vehicle platform level, and is what is analyzed in this chapter. The chapter begins with a
brief look at the history of platform development within Ford Motor Company and how some
of those platforms have evolved over time. Product clockspeed discussions analyze the
response of vehicle platforms to market driven and legislation driven changes. The
development of a vehicle platform is then broken down into four distinct stages in order to
analyze the constraining time factors that drive and hinder rapid platform development.
Historical perspectives- Platform families at Ford Motor Company
The theories behind platform development and platform strategies have been around the
automobile industry since the very beginning. The venerable Model T could be had in
speedster, runabout, pickup truck, and touring car body styles in the 19 1Os. Another major
early Ford Motor Company platform success story occurred with the Mustang. The original
1964% Mustang received virtually all of its underpinnings from the Falcon intermediate sized
vehicle. Thus, by combining a proven platform with proven powertrains that were wrapped
in a newly styled exterior shell, a segment-defining vehicle was developed at a minimum
cost.
Ward's Automotive Yearbooks, the definitive guide of automobile vehicle production facts
and statistics, took a surprising long time to begin officially tracking vehicle platform
designations. In fact, it wasn't until 1982 when platform strategy discussions began to
dominate the automotive news press articles, that Ward's began tracking U.S Car platform
designations and publishing that information in a dedicated section of their yearbooks. By
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analyzing the lifespan of the platforms, an interesting picture begins to emerge regarding the
longevity of platforms. The chart below graphically shows when each of the Ford Motor
Company platforms were in production in North America.
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Historically, Ford Motor Company has introduced just over 1 new passenger car platform
into the North American Market every two years (16 platforms in 26 years). The average
years in production figure of ten years is a rolling average number and might be skewed to
the low side because six of the platforms are still in production, and thus, as time marches on,
it is quite possible that those platforms will continue to be built, and the average may
increase slightly. A couple of interesting notes need to be made to explain some of these data
points. The Mazda 626 platform sneaks into this dataset because the Ford Probe was
constructed off of that platform and built in North America at the Auto Alliance International
Assembly Plant in Flat Rock Michigan. The original Mercury Capri, Ford Fiesta, Festiva,
and Aspire are not depicted in this chart because they were imported into the United States
and thus are not classified as a North American produced passenger car platform.
The long term platform survivors, the Fox and Panther platforms, have provided a solid
foundation for Ford Motor Company's North American passenger car product portfolio since
the late 1970s. A detailed analysis of the Fox platform will be conducted since that platform
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holds the honors of being the longest current running passenger vehicle platform within Ford
Motor Company's North American portfolio.
A detailed analysis of the Fox platform would not be complete without first starting out with
some mention of the history of the Mustang, since the Mustang has been using this platform
for 25 years. The graph below shows how the Mustang's wheelbase and weight has changed
over time.
Figure 10- Mustang Platform Trends Over Time
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Overall length and wheelbase were charted because it is these dimensions that typically
change when vehicles undergo a minor freshening or a major platform change. The vertical
lines on the graph delineate platform changes and the significant platform freshenings.
Vehicle weight is also put into the graph because it is one key measure of the vehicle's
complexity that is offered to consumers. The variety of options, such as convertible or coupe
body styles, and V6 or V8 engines, can drastically alter the performance of a vehicle, and at
the same time, these arrays of options can drive significant engineering content into the
vehicle, which can then directly impact platform development times. For instance, from
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limited. This trend is shown in the graph because the heaviest and lightest shipping weight
lines are close together in the 1974 to 1982 time period. Since a low point in 1979, the
Mustang vehicle and its Fox platform has steadily gained weight and increased in size. This
is due to the increasing complexity and increased numbers of systems that must be present in
a vehicle in order to comply with new regulations and a customer base that demands added
function from the automobile.
The Fox platform, and the Mustang's use of that platform closely follows the evolution of a
platform as outlined by Marc Meyer and Alvin Lehnard2 3 . The Fox platform was developed
to provide Ford Motor Company with a state of the art, lightweight, flexible platform to form
the backbone of the intermediate passenger car segment. The Fairmont and Zephyr, both
cars riding on a 105.5" wheelbase, were the first cars to use the Fox platform. The Mustang
debuted the next model year with a 100.4" wheelbase, and this version of the platform was
called Fox 2. The release of the Mustang off of the Fox platform illustrates a platform
extension or a second generation of the Fox platform family. 1979 also saw the debut of the
Fox Capri, the first derivative product off of the Fox 2 platform. A derivative product off the
Fox 1 platform, named Granada, rolled into dealer showrooms in 1980. A couple more years
after that, LTDs, Marquis, Thunderbirds and Mark VIIs all used variations of the Fox
platform. The platform that originally provided customers with vehicles in the intermediate
segment soon grew to occupy the luxury, intermediate and sporty market segments.
Referring again to the terminology used by Meyer and Lehnard, the Fox platform strategy
provides an example of horizontal leveraging with simultaneous vertical scaling24 . Lehnard
and Meyer call this strategy a beachhead strategy25 because it resembles a military attack on
a beach where soldiers fan out from one specific drop point to overtake a large area. A
pictorial view of the beachhead strategy overlaid with the activities of the Fox platform is
shown in figure 11. The numbers in the cells represent the model years in which the various
products were introduced. Vehicle size classification were determined by considering both
wheelbase and passenger compartment size.
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Figure 11- Fox Platform History and Market Segmentation Strategy
High Mustang Cobra Thunderbird / Mark VI1 / LSC
Performance (1993) Cougar (1980) (1984)
Mid Range Mustang GT / Capri Zephyr (1978) Continental (1982)
Performance (1979)
MildP Mane Mustang (1979) Fairmont (1978) LTD, Marquis (1983)Performance
Small Intermediate Full sized
A vehicle's platform forms the backbone of the vehicle. In the case of the Fox platform, the
platform is constructed in three subassemblies: the front structure, the front floor pan, and the
rear floor pan. These three subassemblies are then joined together to form a complete
underbody assembly. It is the underbody that sets the location of the suspension points, and
the occupants, and prescribes the platform. Onto this one Fox platform, various body shells,
such as Zephyr, Mustang, Thunderbird, and Capri, could be installed. Although large
investment dollars are required to create the unique body shells, even more dollars are
needed to set up the assembly plant body shop to weld and assemble the underbody.
What ultimately led to the success of the Fox platform? The fact that the platform could
accept 5.8L V8s, 5.OL V8s, a 3.8L V6, and 2.3L 14 engines definitely provided Ford with the
opportunity to tailor engine choices to suit the needs of the customers. The fact that the
wheelbase could be stretched from 100.4" to 112.0" definitely provided additional flexibility
for the customers. Additionally, there was enough room in the underbody to accommodate
emission components such as catalytic converters and carbon canisters so that the platform
was not outdated due to emissions noncompliance. The latest round of Fox platform
revisions occurred for the 1999 model year Mustang. Along with new outer sheet metal,
numerous revisions to the floor pan were performed. These changes included an increase in
the depth of the draw of the tunnel area that accommodated greater rear axle travel for
improved ride quality. Additionally, the carbon canister was relocated from underneath the
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fender to underneath the rear quarter panel. Despite the thousands of refinements that have
been made to the Fox platform over time, the basic structure of the Fox underbody remains
the same. Perhaps the biggest reason the platform has survived for so long is the fact that
both the platform and the manufacturing process have evolved through continuous
improvements so that the platform gradually adopted new technologies over time.
Product Clockspeed Analysis
Now that the evolution of platforms within Ford Motor Company has been discussed, one
can shift gears to the analysis of how external market factors affects platform developments.
The first analysis deals with the market effects of gasoline prices on platform development.
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Figure 12 clearly shows the exact occurrence of the oil crises of the 1970s. The October
1973 crude oil price increase was caused by the Arab-Israeli war and the ban on oil exports
from Arabian oil producing nations to the United States2 . The second crisis occurred late in
1979 when the Iranian revolution and subsequent Iran-Iraq war disrupted crude oil
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and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have caused severe fluctuations in the gasoline pump price that
a consumer pays in the United States. Additionally, governmental mandates for oxygenated
fuels and other special additives have slowly driven up the price of pump gas.
The effect on vehicle platforms of these two oil crises is difficult to uncover. For the 1974
model year, Ford Motor Company released the downsized Mustang II vehicle off of the 1971
Pinto Platform. The press releases for the Mustang II were issued August 28, 1973. Thus,
53 days prior to the start of the Yom-Kippur war and a huge jump in US crude oil prices,
Ford released a more fuel-efficient vehicle. No conclusion regarding Ford's ability to react
with platform changes in response to market stimuli can be reached with this Mustang II
example, and this simultaneous timing is dismissed as a mere coincidence.
By examining another platform, the Maverick platform, a similar trend emerges. Ford
introduced the Maverick platform in 1969 as a 1970 model year vehicle. In 1974, the
Maverick platform had a wheelbase stretch to produce the 1974 Granada. Still no usable tie
can be made between the Maverick platform change and the Yom-Kippur oil price
disturbance. By expanding the scope of the investigation to cover 1976-1979, one finds that
Ford introduced the Fox platform 4 years after the first oil crisis. Additionally, the Fiesta
was introduced into the North American Market in 1977. Again, four years after the Yom-
Kippur war.
Before concluding that four years is the magic clockspeed time to develop vehicle platforms
in response to a market stimulus, one must also consider the impacts of the United States
Governments' actions. 1978 Model year vehicles had to comply with an 18 miles per gallon
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rating or face heavy fines. The 1975 Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, which were enacted in response to the jump in crude oil prices
caused by the Arab-Israeli war, forced a change in automakers' strategies. Thus, in reality,
with the signing of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act on December 22, 1975, the
automakers had three years to react to government legislation for 1978 model year vehicles,
and four years to react to market stimuli that disrupted the United States' supply of crude oil.
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Process Clockspeed Analysis
When one takes a systems engineering approach to platform development, instead of the
previously described strategic approach to platform development, a different picture emerges.
One can decompose the automobile development cycle into four distinct stages: architecture,
engineering, verification, and manufacturing. The major contributing forces that determine
the clockspeed of those four cycles are shown in figure 13.
Figure 13- Vehicle Platform Development Stage Breakdown
Product Development Stage Clockspeed key driver
Architecture Clarification of Key program Targets
Engineering Stability of Program Assumptions
Verification Government Certification Process
Manufacturing Tooling lead time
From a project management standpoint, the architecture stage of a project sets the foundation
for the work to come, and the clich6: the better the planning, the quicker the development
cycle; definitely holds true. When performed properly, there should be very little feedback
and rework cycles that occur once the project moves from the architecture stage to the
engineering stage. In the architecture stage, the platform's hard points can be broken down
into several discrete decision variables. The major decision variables are charted below in
figure 14.
Figure 14- Significant Vehicle Platform Architecture Decisions
Principle Characteristics Secondary Characteristics / Interactions
Occupant Quantity / H Point Locations Occupant Clearance Zones
Drivetrain Arrangements Engine / Transmission Lineups and layouts
Cargo Carrying Capacity Luggage type / quantity, Lifestyle uses
Wheelbase
Turning Circle Wheelbase, steering type
Performance Weight, Drag
Weight
Tire / Wheel Lineup Turning Circle, Ground Clearance, Rolling resistance
Fuel Economy Weight, Drag, Friction, Engine / Trans lineup
Suspension Type
The architecting portion of the automobile product development cycle should be able to be
performed by a small very knowledgeable team of individuals in a brief period of time.
Since the predominant outcomes of this phase of the product development cycle are
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knowledge and concepts, and not hardware and test results, a time scale of 3-6 months should
be appropriate to determine the 10 principle characteristics, and the corresponding
interactions and their effects on the secondary characteristics.
The second stage of platform and product development is the engineering stage. This stage
of development involves the creation of the detailed drawings of the thousands of
components that make up an automobile. Along with detailed drawings of all the
components, prototypes and analytical models of the components have to be created so that
the verification stage of the development cycle can begin. This stage of the product
development process consumes the most person hours. If significant changes are made to the
vehicle architecture during this stage, the affects of those changes become extremely difficult
to manage, and the entire platform development process is drawn out over a longer period of
time.
Once the detailed drawings of the components are completed, and significant confidence is
created about the robustness of the design of those components, the next phase of verification
can be performed. At the vehicle level, the verification phase involves the extensive testing
of the vehicle and its systems to comply with all of the customer, emissions, safety and other
federal requirements. Customer requirements can be verified through the use of a wide array
of durability test procedures. Vehicle crash tests are another important round of tests that are
required by the governing bodies, but the effects of the crash tests on vehicle architectures
will not be discussed in this paper. The final round of testing, that of emissions tests, must be
carried out according to strict test procedures outlined by the various governing bodies.
Vehicle platforms have an indirect, but very important link, with emissions compliance.
Vehicle emissions come predominantly from two sources, tailpipe emissions and evaporative
emissions. There is, however, a complex interaction of systems that create tailpipe and
evaporative emissions. These interactions can result from distinct architecture and platform
decisions. For instance, a vehicle's platform can limit the engines that can be installed in it,
and thus may rule out the possibility of installing a taller more modern overhead cam engine
in the engine compartment. By limiting engine choice, a platform may be forced to use older
technology engines that emit higher levels of tailpipe emissions. Additionally, the shear size,
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mass, or coefficient of drag of a platform may force a vehicle's engine to operate at a higher
load and duty cycle, thereby increasing emissions during the federal test procedures.
An automobile's platform can also impact evaporative emissions. An example of this type of
impact is exhaust pipe routing in relationship to the fuel tank and lines. As the fuel warms
up, the combustion characteristics of the fuel changes, and the engine operating conditions
and carbon canister operation cycle must be adjusted accordingly. The early Ford MN12
platform had a unique under driveshaft fuel tank and independent rear suspension
arrangement that forced the exhaust to route around the front, side and rear of the fuel tank.
The routing of the exhaust pipes restricted cooling airflow to the tank, and when coupled
with the fuel tanks unique geometry, created high fuel tank vapor emissions. The high fuel
tank vapor emissions required an extensive carbon can system to bring the platform into
compliance with fuel system evaporative standards. Later versions of the MN12 platform
improved this situation by creating a new fuel tank and exhaust routing, but certain
limitations inherent to the architecture still existed.
In terms of process clockspeed drivers, the government outlines certain test procedures that
must be performed on a vehicle so that it can be sold in the United States, and thus the
process for certifying a vehicle is rigidly controlled. Essentially the burden of proof is placed
on the automobile manufacturer to provide evidence that the vehicle and the platform meets
the federal requirements. Not only does a vehicle have to meet the emission requirements
when it is new, but it also has to meet the in-usage requirements that currently extend to 10
years, 150,000 miles for emission components. The in-usage vehicle requirements are
proven out with fleets of vehicles that run specific tests in order to generate an emission
decay factor that can be used to prove compliance with the regulations. Once the sequence
of tests is performed, and the EPA is satisfied that due diligence was performed during the
development and certification process of the vehicle, an emissions certificate can be issued to
the automobile manufacturer by the EPA.
The fourth stage of the vehicle platform development cycle is the manufacturing stage.
Tooling lead-time predominantly drives this stage's clockspeed. To mass manufacture the
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thousands of components in an automobile, thousands of tools must be created to accurately
shape, bend and assemble the various components. For high quality, mass production tools,
the lead-time may extend upwards of a year, and thus this stage of the cycle greatly impacts
the speed at which a company can develop an automobile platform. In an attempt to speed
up the process, the verification stage and the manufacturing stage can be managed as two
parallel processes. If managed appropriately, this strategy of parallel cycles can speed up the
rate that a manufacturer can develop and manufacture a vehicle platform.
When these four stages of vehicle platform development are laid out sequentially, it is not
surprising that it can take three to five years for a platform to be developed from the ground
up. Recalling that the data in Figure 9 showed that the longest-lived Ford platform has been
manufactured for 27 years, and when platform development time is added to that figure, the
upper bound for the clockspeed of the platform could be considered to be 30 years. In
contrast, the shortest-lived platforms in Figure 9 (FN74 and CT20) were in production in
North America for a paltry 6 years. When development time is added to that production
time, the minimum platform clockspeed time of around 10 years is obtained.
Chapter 3 Conclusions
The 1973 and 1979 oil crisis in the United States created a demand for smaller and more
fuel-efficient vehicles. It was also during this time period that federal government reacted to
citizen's concerns regarding the health of the environment. Thus, the mid 1970s forced the
automakers to simultaneously deal with emissions and fuel economy problems. These
market and legislative stimuli forced automakers to develop smaller, and more efficient
vehicle platforms. Later emission legislation occurred in periods of more stable gasoline and
political climates and has predominantly driven technology changes, and not platform
changes. As automakers have continued to refine their vehicle platforms, performance and
emissions have improved. Figure 15 highlights fuel economy, weight, engine size, and
horsepower to weight trends from 1978 to 2002.
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It is important to remember that passenger vehicle CAFE standards have been 27.5 miles per
gallon ever since 1990. In fact, in 1985 the standard was 27.5, but was readjusted down to
26.0 for 1986-1989 vehicles 28. Essentially, vehicle fuel economy has not improved since
1986. The belief that government legislation, and not consumer buying behaviors, drove the
increase in vehicle fuel economy is strongly supported by this data. Once automobile
manufacturers met the fuel economy target, there was no incentive to overachieve the target.
Additionally, vehicle platforms, after experiencing a great downsizing and weight reduction
program in the late 1970's, have enjoyed modest weight increases since the low point in
1982. The graph also shows that although performance (measured in hp/100 lbs) suffered in
the early 1980s, technology innovations have dramatically improved vehicle performance
since then. Essentially, technology has given the customer better vehicle performance in all
categories except fuel economy.
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Chapter 4- Engine Technology Development
The previous chapter discussed the development of a vehicle and it's platform. The next
level of system decomposition occurs at the engine level. The engine analysis discussions
start off with a brief history discussion of automobile engines and the basic structure and
dimensions that help to define and characterize the architecture of a piston driven engine. A
brief discussion then occurs regarding engine architectures that have challenged the piston
driven engine for dominance. This chapter then charts the rise and fall of V8 powered
engines in passenger automobiles in the United States. The base engine emission control
technology of the positive crankcase ventilation valves is explored in detail by use of a
system engineering decomposition. The introduction of this emission technology is traced
back to the federal legislation that was discussed in previous chapters. The Positive
Crankcase Ventilation system was chosen for decomposition for two reasons. That system
represents the most simplistic emission control device and it was also the first mandated
automobile emission component.
Historical Perspective
Over the 100 years that Ford Motor Company has sold automobiles, Ford Motor Company
has developed numerous engine technologies to make vehicles more reliable and more
powerful. The first engines that Ford Motor Company produced were opposed 2 cylinder
units that put out 8 HP2 9 . In the early days of the industry, when a dominant engine design or
vehicle type was not established, Ford Motor Company experimented with different engine
architectures. In 1906, Ford produced three engines, an Opposed 2 cylinder unit, an 1-4, and
an I-630. When the Model T was introduced in 1909, the 177 cubic inch 1-4 engine that
powered the vehicle epitomized simplistic design for manufacturability that Henry Ford
knew was important in order to become the first mass producer of automobiles. 1909 was
also the year that Ford Motor Company switched to producing just one type of engine for
their mass-produced automobile product portfolio.
As the automobile industry matured, engines needed to be designed not just for
manufacturability, but also for reliability, ease of starting, and performance. Additionally,
the engine had to fit inside an automobile body that became more and more stylized over
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time. As time marched on, the electric and steam powered vehicles that were offered at the
turn of the century were forced out of the marketplace by gasoline combustion engine
vehicles. By the 1920s, dominant vehicle and engine architectures were established. A brief
discussion regarding basic engine dimensions and invading engine technologies is required
prior to embarking on an analysis of automobile engine architectures and engine families.
Base Engine Architecture Discussions
The most important base engine dimension is bore center distance. This basic dimension
directly affects three other characteristics: how long the engine block is, the largest piston
diameter that can be installed in the engine, and the available area in the combustion chamber
for valves. The second most important dimension is deck height, a dimension that can be
measured two ways depending on the engine block construction. On monoblock engines with
integral cylinder heads and blocks, the deck height is measured from the centerline of the
crankshaft to the top of the piston at the location when the piston is at top dead center. For
engines with separate cylinder heads and cylinder blocks, the deck height is measured from
the centerline of the crankshaft to the top surface of the engine block. Deck height is a major
contributor to the stroke limitations of the engine block because this dimension limits the
maximum piston travel allowed in the block.
A third base engine relationship, rod ratio, provides an approximation to determine maximum
piston speed and piston side loading effects, both of which are important for engine
durability. Additionally, the rod ratio prescribes the swept area of the rod, and thus helps to
determine crankcase wall and ribbing locations. By utilizing the three characteristics, bore
center distance, deck height, and rod ratio, an engine's architecture can be created that is
independent of engine displacement, but has certain maximum displacement limits.
The last key decision facing an automobile engine architect is valve train type. Side valve,
overhead valve, overhead cam, and dual overhead cam are the most common arrangements.
These valve type arrangements roughly follow the chronological development of the
automobile engine, however exceptions to this progression do exist. When the engine
architect lays out the bore center distance, the deck height and then adds the valve train type,
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the package space that the base engine will occupy is essentially prescribed. It is from these
engine dimensions that most four-stroke piston engine architectures, including diesel engines,
are laid out.
The terminology discussed in the preceding paragraphs will be used to determine engine
families and their production history later on in this chapter. Prior to the engine family
discussions, some brief statements regarding invading engine technologies need to be made.
These invading technologies each have architectural weak points that have prevented the
architecture from becoming dominant.
Invading Engine Technologies Discussions
There have been five unique architectures in the history of the automobile industry that have
challenged the piston engine for dominance in the passenger vehicle market. These five
predatory technologies are steam, battery-electric, turbine, rotary combustion engine, and
most recently, fuel cell powered automobiles. The competitive advantages and
disadvantages as well as a very brief history of each of these five engine technologies are
briefly discussed below.
Steam powered automobiles were present from the beginning of the automobile industry. In
fact, in 1771 some sources credit Nicolas Joseph Cugnot as being the first person to get into
an automobile accident when he crashed his steam powered vehicle into a brick wall3 1 . A
steam-powered automobile's architecture has several shortcomings. First off, the start up
time to achieve a full head of steam turned away many customers. Secondly, steam powered
cars required two fuels and constant refilling. Thirdly, early steam cars contained a
bewildering array of fittings and piping that required constant maintenance. These
combinations of architecture limitations were never overcome, and in the mid 1920s,
America's best-known steam car producer, the Stanley Motor Carriage Company, folded.
1899 and 1900 marked the high point in the battery powered electric automobile industry
because in those years more electric vehicles were sold than any other type of vehicles3 2. The
main competitive advantage that these vehicles offered was their ease of use and instant
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starting ability. Recently battery electric vehicle have made a minor comeback as a niche
vehicle to provide smaller scale transportation in city centers and suburbia (i.e. Th!nk
Neighbor and City Vehicles), and as traditional vehicles (GM's EVl, Ford's electric Ranger,
and Toyota's electric Rav4). Federal regulations have recently been passed that created a
special class for vehicles that have top speeds under 25 mph and are predominantly electric
powered. Even with the new battery-electric vehicles, the predominant architecture
limitation comes from the limited range these vehicles can travel between charging, and the
time required to accomplish the charge.
Turbine powered automobiles have never enjoyed widespread commercial success. From a
North American passenger car market standpoint, the Chrysler Turbine car of 1964 was the
closest the architecture came to widespread attention. 50 of these 1964 Chrysler vehicles
were delivered to carefully screened customers for evaluation. These cars featured 130 HP
engines, but their main downsides were throttle lag, noise, and the large quantity of hot
exhaust gases that these engines expelled. From an architecture standpoint, one major
advantage of a turbine engine is it's low part count. Other automobile manufacturers like
Ford Motor Company also experimented with this engine architecture, but production cars
were never created.
The automotive Rotary engine, having been developed at first by Felix Wankel, then by
NSU, and finally Mazda, has enjoyed a colorful and successful existence in automobiles.
One of the first automotive applications that enjoyed commercial success was the Mazda
Cosmo Sport that contained a 110 horsepower twin rotor engine. While still operating on a
four-stroke engine cycle (intake, compression, combustion, and exhaust), this engine utilized
a rounded triangular shaped rotor and a peritrochoid curve shaped combustion area. The
main disadvantage of the Wankel architecture was the difficulty in obtaining a good seal
between the rotor and the combustion chamber wall. Poor lip sealing led to reduced engine
durability and increased oil consumption. Unfortunately, increased oil consumption also
tends to lead to higher hydrocarbon emissions. After disappearing from the United States
market for 6 model years, the rotary engine is once again available in Mazda's 2004 RX8
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vehicle. This engine architecture has made a comeback and is once again challenging the
piston engine for dominance.
Another architecture limitation of the rotary engine is its inherent inflexibility for engine
displacement adjustment. Varying the displacement of a traditional combustion engine is
accomplished by changing the bore size and stroke of the engine. Both of these actions can
occur with relatively minor tooling or manufacturing costs. In contrast, a rotary engine's
displacement is relatively fixed. Once the rotary engine is in production, it is much more
difficult and costly to change the displacement than it is to change the displacement of a
traditional piston engine. From an architecture standpoint, the piston driven engine
architecture allows a greater scalability than that of the rotary engine.
Fuel cell vehicles are the latest type of vehicles to challenge the piston driven engine for
supremacy. Virtually all the major automobile manufacturers are engaged in some fuel cell
vehicle research. The process that most fuel cells use to generate electricity typically starts
with a source of hydrogen. In the fuel cell stack, the hydrogen atoms are stripped of their
electrons to form hydrogen ions. Oxygen from the air then is combined with the positively
charged hydrogen ions to form water that is expelled out of the vehicle as waste. It is the
stripped electrons from the hydrogen atoms that provide the electrical energy to power an
electric motor in automotive fuel cell applications.
One major downside to the fuel cell architecture is the processing required to reform
hydrogen. Although hydrogen is available as a commercial gas, the hydrogen infrastructure
does not exist to support hydrogen refueling stations. Since there is limited availability to
consumers of pure hydrogen gas, the automakers are forced to develop mobile hydrogen
reforming technologies to convert widely available gases into hydrogen. The fuel reforming
technology adds significant part and electronic control complexity to the automobile. Due to
the complex nature of the fuel cells and the fuel reformers, the fuel cell architecture is
currently inhibited by extremely high cost and questionable reliability in real world driving
environments. Only time will tell if the fuel cell technology can mature enough to become a
viable alternative to the piston engine automobile.
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Engine Innovation Cycles
One particular way of analyzing the innovation cycles of an industry is extensively discussed
33by James Utterback in his book Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation . In this book, an
industry's innovation cycle is illustrated by comparing the number of companies entering and
exiting an industry, and then showing the total number of firms engaged in the business at
any time. By using this heuristic, figure 16 is developed for the Ford North American V8
engine history.
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Unfortunately the sample size is too small in this analysis to draw meaningful conclusions
regarding the innovation cycles of the Ford V8 engine. By broadening the scope of the
investigation to include all North American produced V8 engines from 1914-2004, a much
different trend of the industry is uncovered. This trend is illustrated graphically in figure 17
by using Prof. Utterback's techniques while the data is displayed in several of the appendices.
Appendix C, D, and E list the V8 engine architecture production histories for Ford Motor
Company, General Motors, and Chrysler Corporation respectively. Appendix F summarizes
the data for those three manufacturers and also includes data for the Studebaker-Packard and
AMC V8 engines. By combining all the North American manufacturer's V8 production
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history into one graph, the glory days of the muscle car era with large V8 engines, and
astonishing performance is uncovered.
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Two conflicting forces were working against the late 1960s V8. The first force was emission
regulations, and the second force was fuel economy concerns. Unfortunately these two
forces created havoc in the industry in the relatively short amount of time from 1969 to 1979.
It is most interesting to note that no new North American V8s engine families were
introduced into the marketplace between 1971 and 1989. Instead, that period of time was
characterized by engine displacement changes and engine technology additions. Carburetors
of the sixties and seventies were replaced with mechanical fuel injection systems in the late
seventies and early eighties, and then those systems were replaced with sequential fuel
injection systems. All these technology additions mounted onto a base engine architecture
that had not changed since the fifties and sixties.
This next set of data analyzes the engine trends over time by taking a broader view of the
North American automobile market. The data shows how V8 engine production declined,
V6 engine production modestly increased, and 1-4 engine production dramatically increased
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between 1978 and 1983. The most dramatic data point that needs to be highlighted in figure
18 is that in 1969, 89% of the passenger vehicles manufactured and sold in the United States
were equipped with V8 engines, while less than 1% of all domestically produced and sold
vehicles were equipped with four cylinder engines. The raw data used to generate this chart
is available for review in Appendix G.
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The data clearly supports the innovation cycles that Professor Utterback describes. In fact it
is very interesting to examine how the American V-8s tried to fight off the six cylinder and
four cylinder invasions into the passenger car market. The Ford Small block V8, which
debuted on the market in 1962 as a 221 cubic inch displacement engine, steadily grew to 351
cubic inches in 1969. As emissions and fuel economy concerns drove customers into four
cylinder and six cylinder automobiles, Ford Motor Company responded by developing a new
displacement small block V8, 255 cubic inches, in 1980. Ford was not alone with this small
V8 counterattack. General Motors released their smallest version of their small block engine,
262 cubic inches, for 1975, and released another smaller version, a 267 cubic inch derivative,
for use in passenger vehicles between 1979-198237. What is remarkable is that the 262 and
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the 267 cubic inch derivatives of the Chevrolet small block came from the same small block
architecture that produced the 400 cubic inch small block V8.
General Motors pushed V8 technology innovation even further than Ford Motor Company
did in the late seventies and early eighties. One particular innovative path ended in a disaster
for the North American automobile market. In 1978, General Motors came out with a 350
cubic inch diesel derivative version of their Oldsmobile small block V8. This engine was
available until 1985. Another smaller derivative displacing 260 cubic inches was created for
the 1979 and 1980 model years38 based off of that same Oldsmobile small block engine
architecture. Unfortunately, the durability of these engines proved to be unacceptable
because the engines frequently suffered from cracked cylinder head bolts and blown head
gaskets.
Another noteworthy innovation, again from General Motors, was the modulated
displacement V8. In 1981-1983 model year Cadillacs, a modulated displacement Cadillac
368 cubic inch V8 was offered. This Cadillac engine could operate as a V8, a V6, and a V4
engine by utilizing a blocker plate that deactivated specific rocker arms based on engine load
and speed criteria. Unfortunately, the electronic controls on this engine had a difficult time
smoothing out the power transitions as cylinders were activated and deactivated, and thus the
buying public shied away from vehicles with this novel technology. Ironically, General
Motors and other major manufacturers have recently begun experimenting once again with
variable displacement, or displacement on demand engines. With the advances in electronic
controls that have occurred since the early 1980s, and specifically with the industry's
acceptance of electronic throttle controls, the power transitions that plagued the Cadillac
design can now be smoothed out to the point that the transitions cannot be noticed by the
consumers. Now that the variable displacement engine and its control technology has
matured, the technology will be featured in more and more automobiles in the next couple of
years.
The new smaller versions of the small block engines, the diesel derivatives of the
Oldsmobile small block, and the variable displacement Cadillac V8 proved that once again,
established technologies and products can go through a rapid innovation cycle when faced
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with increased business pressures caused by changing market conditions. Unfortunately
these rapid innovations in base engine and control technologies were not enough to maintain
compliance with the government's emission regulations. All passenger car engines still need
to rely on bolt on systems to pass the federal tests. The Positive Crankcase Ventilation
(PCV) system is one of these bolt on emission systems, and it is this system that is
systematically decomposed and analyzed in the paragraphs below. The next chapter, Chapter
five, analyzes the catalytic converter system, a system that is a significantly more complex
than the PCV system.
Positive Crankcase Ventilation System Analysis
The primary function of the PCV system is to reduce crankcase hydrocarbon emissions and
crankcase pressure by using the pressure differential between the intake manifold and the
crankcase to redirect a metered amount of crankcase vapors into the combustion chamber. A
secondary function of the PCV valve itself is to prevent engine seal and crankcase damage
resulting from pressure pulses caused by an engine backfire event. The early PCV systems
that were mandated in 1961 for vehicles sold in California in 1963 were simple systems that
consisted of three components:
1. Inlet tube that connected the PCV valve to the valve cover
2. The PCV valve itself which consisted of a housing with a metering spring and check
valve
3. An outlet tube that connected the PCV valve to a port on the carburetor or intake
manifold
The PCV system design is an ideal candidate for system engineering decomposition because
an analysis of the system involves just a handful of parameters. To systematically
decompose any system, a parameter diagram (P-diagram) and system engineering cascade
diagram can be used to gain insight into the primary function of the system, and error states
inherent in the design of the architecture. For both diagrams, the system boundary and
components must first be identified. In the case of the PCV system, the system consists of
the previously mentioned three components: inlet tube, valve, and outlet tube.
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PCV System Engineering Decomposition
When lawmakers first created the regulations, the regulations stipulated that there was to be
no crankcase gases directly routed to the atmosphere. This meant that the crankcase road
draft tube, an architecture consisting of a simple pipe that routed crankcase vapors away from
the engine, was obsolete. In system engineering terms, the regulators had created a
mandatory vehicle level target. Now that a new target was established, the automobile
industry could develop a new architecture to comply with that target.
A system decomposition of the PCV system identifies the overlying megasystem. In this
case, the megasystem includes the citizens, the lawmakers, and the physical environment.
The megasystem cascaded the requirement of "no crankcase emissions" to the vehicle
manufacturers. The vehicle manufacturer then cascaded this new vehicle level target to the
engine engineers who then developed a system architecture that could comply with the new
target. Once the system architecture was developed, component testing, subsystem testing,
system testing, and finally vehicle testing could be developed to verify compliance with the
new regulation. This target cascade process forms the basis of the system engineering
diagram, and is illustrated graphically in figure 19.











Prior to designing a system, but after receiving targets, a parameter diagram (P-Diagram)
needs to be constructed to understand what energy transfers occur in the system. It is the P-
diagram that helps to visually link the target cascades to an appropriate system architecture
while maintaining awareness of the vehicle interfaces and energy transfers that this emission
control device must be compatibly with. Signal factors, noise factors, ideal function, error
45
states and control factors are the broad group of terms that are used to categorize the energy
transfers within the system, and these five categories of items are described in the P-Diagram.
After receiving a target cascade, the next step in the P-Diagram process is to identify signal
factors, or inputs into the system. In this case, crankcase pressure, gas composition, and
temperature, along with intake manifold pressure, are the primary signal factors. The ideal
function, or response must now be determined. As previously mentioned, the ideal function
is to reduce 100% of the crankcase hydrocarbon emissions and crankcase pressure by using
the pressure differential between the intake manifold and the crankcase to route a metered
amount of crankcase vapors into the combustion chamber.
Once the signal factors and ideal function of the system are determined, a detailed analysis of
the noise factors can be performed. For the PCV system, noise factors include customer
drive cycle variations (for example the vehicle may be used for racing purposes where the
engine spends much of its life producing peak power) and environmental noise factors (for
example the vehicle may spend most of its life in a climate that sees numerous freeze and
thaw cycles.). Other noise factors that affect the system performance could include effects of
mileage and engine wear over time.
In general, automobile noise factors can be classified into one of five categories: customer
usage, subsystem interactions, environmental interactions, piece-to-piece variations, and
aging effects. For automobiles that tend to receive a lot of customized non dealer installed
additions, a legitimate case for adding a noise factor for customization could be included,
however, it becomes quite difficult to outline every possible ramification for every
customization action that is available on the marketplace.
After understanding the noise factors, the control factors can then be identified. This step is
probably the most critical step because it is the control factors that determine the basic
architecture of the system. In the case of the PCV system, the control factors that were
chosen in 1963 were inlet and outlet tube diameters (diameters affect pressure and flow rate
of the gases), PCV orifice size, and PCV spring pressure. Thus, by defining these as control
factors, it is now implicitly clear that a series of tubes and hoses along with an orifice and
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spring will be used to meter the flow of crankcase gases. The architecture of the PCV system
has now been determined.
Determining the architecture of the system is not enough though, because the architecture
must be robust to error states. Fortunately, there are relatively few error states for the PCV
system. Specifically, the error states relate to flowing too much gas, flowing not enough gas,
or leaking gas to the atmosphere. The system architecture must inherently prevent, or
fundamentally not allow, these three error states to occur. Fortunately there is relatively few
failure modes associated with each of these three error states. The failure modes and error
states are outlined below
Figure 20- Vehicle Error State Relationships
Error State Vehicle Failure Mode Cause of Failure
Flows too much gas vehicle stalls / hesitation incorrect system flow rate
high oil consumption frozen valve
partially stuck valve
Flows too little gas blown engine seals frozen valve
partially stuck valve
Leaks to atmosphere fail emission standards inadequate hose design
inadequate joint design
A pictorial view of the PCV P-Diagram, including all the previously mentioned signal
factors, noise factors, ideal function and error state information, is shown in figure 21. In the
ideal case, 100% of the energy of the signal factors would be translated into energy to
achieve the ideal function, and there would be no energy transferred to any of the error states.
Figure 21- PCV System P-Diagram
Noise Factors
-Customer drive cycle variations (racing, grocery getting)
-Environment variations (humidity, cold)
-High mileage (worn piston rings)
Ideal function / Intended results
PCV System Eliminate crankcase hydrocarbon emissions
Signal Factors and crankcase pressure by routing
-Crankcase pressure In Tue crankcase vapors into the air induction
-Gas composition -Outlet Tube
-Crankcase temperature Error states / Unintended results
-Intake manifold pressure 
-Flow too much crankcase gases
-Flow not enough gases







The inherent simplicity of the PCV system, and the bolt on aspect of it's system design,
allowed manufacturers to quickly add this emission control device within two years of the
passage of the regulation requiring the control of crankcase emissions. By using system-
engineering fundamentals, the problem of early crankcase emissions was solved at the
system level using three components that could experience three distinct error states with five
unique causes of failure. That level of complexity was easily managed, and can still be easily
managed within a two-year development period.
The basic architecture of the PCV system has not changed in the 40 years since its
introduction. Refinements have been made, however, to ensure a more robust design in a
wider range of operating conditions. To prevent PCV freezing, a situation where crankcase
condensation freezes the PCV valve in one position, some manufacturers use electrical
heating strategies or engine coolant piping to prevent this error state. These modern
solutions introduce a couple more failure causes into the system (for instance, intermittent
electrical contact, or coolant leaks), but still the system has an easily managed array or
variables that can be precisely controlled. The use of water heating or electrical heating of
the PCV valve is an example of technology layering where two proven technologies are
adopted into a common architecture to create a system with added functionality.
Chapter 4 Conclusions
During the early years of the automobile industry from 1895-1910, there were numerous
propulsion architectures that all struggled to become the dominant source of power for
automobiles. From 1910-2003, the unquestionable dominant architecture has been the four-
stroke internal combustion engine. So far, that architecture has been flexible enough to
satisfy the consumer's transportation needs, while at the same time complying with
government emission standards. As standards have toughened, systems like the PCV system
have been added to the base engine in order to bring the complete vehicle into compliance
with the regulations. Fuel cell technologies are now beginning to challenge the industry's
mindset that automobiles need to be powered by combustion engines. Only time will tell if
fuel cells technologies will form the basis of the architecture for the next generation of
automobile power plants. The four-stroke internal combustion engine will undoubtedly fight
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back against this new market predator. The combustion engine will most likely fight back by
being bestowed with new technologies and systems, such as variable displacement engine
technologies that will be layered on top of the existing base engine architecture.
The clockspeed of the base V8 engine architecture is surprisingly slow. Each of the Big
Three North American automakers had V8 engine architectures in production for over 30
years. Ford Motor Company's shortest production run for a V8 engine architecture was six
years and that occurred on the Lincoln Y-block engine family (refer to data in Appendix C).
In contrast, the rolling average production run for all the V8 engine architectures as shown in
appendix F is 17.1 years. Thus the clockspeed of the North American V8 engine ranges from
six to 30 years, with an industry average of just over 17 years.
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Chapter 5- Catalytic Converter Technology Implementation
This chapter examines the architecture of the catalytic converter system. To begin the
discussions, a brief history of automobile catalytic converters is presented. This historical
analysis reviews how the catalytic converter architecture has changed over time and also
reveals some of the downfalls to today's converter architecture. A brief discussion regarding
historic precious metal prices follows in order to provide some quantifiable insights into a
major disadvantage of today's converter technology. After the historical review, the three-
way ceramic substrate catalytic converter system is analyzed by a series of system
engineering decompositions. A major portion of the analysis focuses on diagramming the
complex system interactions that occur between the catalytic converter and the rest of an
automobile's systems. A functional diagram and a design structure matrix are constructed to
facilitate the system analysis and to provide a way of better managing the development
process of a catalytic converter system.
Historical Perspective- The birth of the automobile catalytic converter
Catalytic began to appear in high volumes on vehicles for sale in the United States during the
1975 model year. The first catalytic converters were called two-way catalysts because they
converted HC and CO into water vapor and carbon dioxide through the chemical process
known as oxidization. The precious metals platinum and palladium were used to facilitate
that oxidation process. In 1976, three-way catalysts entered the California marketplace on
certain 1977 model year Volvo 240s. Those vehicles utilized a three- way catalyst system
and no Exhaust Gas Recirculation system to achieve the required emissions standards. The
three-way catalysts consist of the oxidation catalysts previously described, and a reduction
catalyst that converts NOx into diatomic nitrogen and diatomic oxygen. Modern three way
catalyst systems typically contain a mixture of platinum, palladium and rhodium.
The widespread use of catalytic converters brought about changes in other industries,
specifically the gasoline industry, and the precious metal mining industry. Catalytic
converters, which were vulnerable to poisoning by leaded gasoline, coupled with the health
dangers posed by lead additives, quickly drove leaded gasoline out of the marketplace. The
effects of catalytic converters on the precious metal industry were even more dramatic.
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Historical Perspective- Precious Metal Market Effects of the Catalytic Converter
As mentioned previously, the modem three-way catalyst architecture relies on platinum,
palladium, and rhodium. One way to analyze the effects that the automobile catalytic
converters had on the precious metal industry is to look at the worldwide usage percentage of
each metal. Appendix H lists the yearly worldwide demand for Platinum, Palladium, and
Rhodium in tabular form. Figure 22 is a graphical presentation of that data.
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Two key points to focus in on are that ever since 1990, over 80% of the world's Rhodium
demand has been driven by automotive catalyst needs. Additionally, since 1997, over 50%
of the world's Palladium demand has stemmed from automotive catalyst needs. The
automobile industry's insatiable appetite for precious metal has even created an industry
containing specialized companies devoted to automotive catalyst recycling. The precious
metal reclamation trends from used automobile catalysts are shown for reference in
Appendix I, while the raw data is shown in Appendix H. By having such a large percentage
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segment, and to also have that one industry segment be susceptible to highly cyclical sales,
definitely contributes to market and pricing instability. Dramatic fluctuations in Rhodium
prices have existed between 1989 and 1993, as well as from 1999 to 2001. These price
fluctuations are shown in figure 23. The data used to generate this graph is contained in
Appendix J.
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When the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 were established, few people could have
predicted that the enabling technology for automobiles to comply with the strict standards
would have had such a dramatic effect on the worldwide precious metal market. From a
business and system architecture standpoint it is unwise to develop any architecture or any
system that consumes 90% of the world's production of any substance. Diversity, instead of
a monopoly, is typically the preferred route. In the future, when alternate emission control
technologies are developed, the precious metal mining, trading, and refining industries could
be severely devastated if those new technologies do not rely on the current mix of precious
metals.
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Historical Perspective- Changes in Automobile Catalytic Converter Substrate Technology
Shortly after catalysts appeared on vehicles, a technology change began to occur with the
catalyst internals. Early catalytic converters featured a technology similar to what was found
in the hydrocarbon cracking industry. That architecture consisted of alumina pellets that
were coated with washcoat and precious metals. The pellet architecture soon proved to be
problematic in automobiles. The vibration and duty cycles that an automobile catalyst
experiences caused the pellets to vibrate against one another and eventually degrade. In
response to the degradation over time, the automobile industry shifted to coated cordierite
ceramic substrates. These substrates contained a honeycomb arrangement of long channels
with very thin walls. A chemical washcoat, consisting of a complex chemical mix including
ceria and nickel, is typically applied to these ceramic substrates. The washcoat greatly
increases the surface area available for the catalytic reaction to occur on, while the ceria
additive provides an oxygen storage capability and the nickel additive prevents the creation
of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas. Platinum, palladium, and rhodium are then added to the
washcoat to provide activation sites for the catalytic conversion of the exhaust gases to occur.
A new technology threatens the dominance of the ceramic substrate. The new predator is
metallic substrates. Although metallic substrates are typically more expensive than their
ceramic counterparts, metallic substrates can offer faster warm-up times that can then lead to
decreased vehicle emissions. Additionally, two other advantages of the metallic substrates
are that they are not as brittle as the ceramic substrates, and that they have a coefficient of
thermal expansion that more closely matches the expansion coefficient of stainless steel.
Both of these characteristics can work together to make metallic substrates more resistant to
cracking during use in an automobile.
Whether the substrate is metallic or ceramic, the function of the substrate remains the same.
Since the ceramic substrate is currently the dominant architecture with today's catalytic
converters, and since future vehicles continue to plan on using the ceramic substrate
technology, the system engineering decompositions will be performed on a ceramic monolith
three-way catalyst system.
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Three-Way Catalyst System Analysis
By using a system's approach for architecture decomposition, an orderly decomposition of
the catalyst system can be performed. Prior to starting this decomposition, a couple
comments regarding the catalyst system boundary must be clarified. First off, the upstream
and downstream limit of the catalyst system must be defined. For the upstream end, some
vehicles have catalyst directly integrated into the exhaust manifolds. Since the catalyst only
becomes effective after it has reached operating temperature, a system's architect could argue
that the most optimum system location is too integrate the catalyst into the exhaust manifold.
Assuming the temperature limits of the catalyst are not exceeded, this statement, by itself is
probably true. However, since there are so many packaging constraints within a vehicle in
order to allow room for other components, assembly at the plant, or disassembly at a dealer,
the catalyst is frequently a separate piece from the exhaust manifold. For this paper, the
catalyst assembly is considered a separate item from the exhaust manifold, and the catalyst
input is considered to be the exhaust gas coming from the exhaust manifold. These
statements define the upstream limit of the catalyst system.
A similar definition needs to be defined to determine the downstream end of the catalyst
system. From a variable cost standpoint, it is typically cheaper to not have a joint between
the catalyst and the muffler system. Unfortunately vehicle packaging constraints, or even
package density shipping constraints or manufacturing processes sometimes require the
addition of a joint between the catalyst (hot end of the exhaust system) and the muffler (the
cold end of the exhaust system). The joint between the hot end and cold end for this paper
will be the downstream end of the catalyst system.
Now that the upstream and downstream ends of the system are defined, a P-Diagram can be
created for the system. The P diagram outlines the signal, noise, response, control factors
and error states for the system. What is realized by constructing a parameter diagram is that
the function, error states, noise, response, and control factors of the catalytic converter can
actually be broken down into two categories. One category of actions relates to the
transportation of gases towards and away from the catalyst internals, and the other set of
actions relate to the activities that occur with-in the catalyst. Decomposing the catalytic
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converter this way yields the two P-Diagrams that are shown in figure 24. The first diagram
relates to the catalytic converter assembly, while the second diagram relates to the catalyst
internals.








-Customer drive cycle variations (racing, grocery getting)
-Environment variations (humidity, road salt)
-High engine mileage (increased oil consumption, reduced power)
Ideal system function /
Catalyst Shell Assembly Intended results
S-inlet flange -outlet cone Provide a low leak flow path with the
-inlet pipe -outlet pipe minimal amount of restriction for the
-inlet cone -outlet flange transportation of the engine out gas
-shell -CMS boss from the exhaust manifolds to the
-HEGO boss muffler system
Error states / Unintended
results
-Air leakage into system
-Engine outgas leakage out of system
Control Factors -High flow rate restriction
-Inlet and outlet pine diameter -Objectionable system resonance
-Inlet and outlet pipe bend radii
-Inlet and outlet cone geometry
-Inlet and outlet flange construction
-Catalyst can and pipe gauging
Catalyst Internals Parameter Diagram
Noise Factors
-Customer driw cycle variations (racing, grocery getting)
-Environment variations (humidity, road salt)
-High engine mileage (increased oil consumption, reduced power)
. Ideal system function /
Catalyst Internals Intended results
-front substrate seal -rear substrate seal Reduce the lewls of HC, CO, and NOxSignal Factors -front substrate -rear substrate of the engine outgas to acceptable
-Engine vibration -front substrate mount -rear substrate mount levels
-Engine outgas -front was hcoat type -rear was hcoat type
-Engine load -front substrate loading -rear substrate loading




Control Factors -Excessive HC emissions
-Front and rear substrate cell densities -Objectionable smell (presence of H2S)
-Front and rear substrate wall thickness
-Substrate mount bulk density
-Front and rear seal type
-Catalyst can to substrate gap
-Washcoat and loading specification
The characteristic of these two systems that allow them to be decoupled in two parameter
diagrams is the degree to which their ideal function and error states are separated. There is a
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Catalyst Converter Assembly Parameter Diagram
distinct decoupling of the ideal function of the catalyst assembly (a function related to
transporting engine outgas), and the ideal function of the catalyst internals (a function which
is to convert engine outgas). Additionally, there is a complete decoupling of the error states
associated with these two subsystems. A critic to this decomposition arrangement might
come up with the argument that the flow distribution and velocity profile of the engine
outgas greatly depends on the geometry of the catalyst assembly inlet pipes and cones, and
that substrate conversion efficiencies can be impacted greatly by these characteristics. First
off, that argument is correct, however, that pitfall can easily be avoided. By having a target
cascade for velocity profile and flow distribution given to the catalyst assembly team from
the catalyst internals team, these interactions can be successfully managed, and the parameter
diagram can remain decoupled.
The P-Diagrams, at a high level, outlined the structure of the catalyst system. In order to
analyze the architecture of the system, it is important to clearly define the primary function of
each of the components in the system. Figure 25 describes each component of the catalyst
system and the primary function intrinsic to each of those components.













Seal exhaust system to exhaust manifold
Route exhaust gases towards catalyst bricks
Positions oxygen sensor in exhaust stream
Decreases exhaust velocity and routes exhaust to catalyst
brick
Prevents exhaust gases from eroding the catalyst mount
Provides large surface area for exhaust gas to react with
washcoat and precious metals
Increases substate surface area for better conversion of
gases
Activation sites where catalytic reaction occurs
Maintain position of catalyst brick during all operating
conditions
Channels exhaust gases to outlet pipe
routes exhaust gases to the muffler system
Permits independent assembly and disassembly of catalyst
and muffler assemblies
The benefit of this primary function analysis is that this procedure easily highlights some
shortcomings in the technology and the architecture of the system. For instance, the brick
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Primary FunctionComponent
seal prevents exhaust gases from eroding the catalyst mount. Essentially the cause of this
error state is that the substrate mounting material is not necessarily robust to continued
impingement by the hot exhaust outgas. Two distinct system solutions can remedy this error
state. First of, mounting material technology changes could be investigated that are more
resistant to the impingement of gases. Secondly, the directional flow rate and velocity of the
incoming engine outgas could be modified such that mounting material sees acceptable
impingement and temperature levels. Both of these actions would eliminate the need for the
brick seal.
A similar analysis of the catalyst mounting system also yields a shortcoming in the
architecture of the system. The purpose of the substrate mount is to maintain position of the
brick during all operating conditions. A secondary function of the mounting system is to
protect the brittle ceramic substrates from the loads and impacts that a vehicle experiences.
An interrelated failure mode of this secondary function is substrate cracking or loosening
caused by the different thermal expansion coefficients of the converter shell assembly and
the ceramic substrate. This subject was touched on briefly earlier on in the chapter, and the
invading technology, that of metallic substrates, offers a solution for this failure mode.
Organizational Clockspeed Analysis
In order to speed up the technology development and product implementation cycle, a
company can divide up the tailpipe emissions responsibilities into four separate groups. This
decomposition allows a small group of individuals to develop core competencies in substrate
retention technologies and specifications of combustion after treatment systems. This same
group can be charged with the task of developing a corporate strategy for substrates
complexity thereby lowering the cost to develop vehicle specific catalyst assemblies. The
second group of individuals, those who are responsible for the vehicle specific catalytic
converter, can become experts in the unique packaging and environmental conditions that are
present in each automobile. The third group of individuals can become experts in the
development of software calibrations to ensure that the vehicle meets all the customer
requirements and emissions regulations relating to engine and powertrain performance.
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The fourth and final group, consisting of numerous individuals, is responsible for engine
design and development. This organizational arrangement is highlighted in figure 26.
Figure 26- Tailpipe Emissions Subgroups and Responsibilities
Sub Group Responsibilities
Catalytic Converter Assembly Develop and release vehicle specific converter assemblies
Catalytic Converter Internals Develop corporate guidelines for converter construction
Release vehicle specific converter internals
Powertrain Calibration Develop and release vehicle specific powertrain calibrations
to meet Customer and Federal Requirements
Engine Development Design and Release engine systems
This organization structure supports the Parameter Diagram organizational structure that
illustrated how the catalyst internals functions and failure modes are significantly decoupled
from the catalyst assembly responsibilities. The engine development and powertrain
calibration team have decoupled error states and failure modes as well. Additionally, all the
significant contributors to tailpipe emissions are reflected in each of these four groups. From
a functional standpoint, each of the four groups handles distinctively different input and
output signals as outlined in figure 27.
Figure 27- Tailpipe Emissions Functional Diagram
INPUT OUTPUT
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This functional diagram is arranged in a manner that illustrates the sequences that occur
when a customer wants to use an automobile for its primary function. The primary function
of an automobile is to provide a means to transport people and goods over land. To make
this primary function occur, a customer starts the car, places the vehicle in the desired gear,
and depresses the accelerator. The powertrain calibration interprets the customer's demands,
and generates electrical signals to control the engine. Signals then activate the fuel pump to
provide fuel rail pressure, activate the fuel injectors and spark plugs, and momentarily
engage the starter. The engine then produces rotational power that can be used to propel the
vehicle.
Unfortunately, the generation of rotational power relies on the combustion of hydrocarbons,
and thus one of the secondary outputs of the engine, the engine outgas, must be cleaned up.
The engine's outgas passes through the catalytic converter, and then, through chemical
conversions, the NOx, CO, and unburned hydrocarbons are converted to Water, CO 2 and N2 .
The catalyst's outgas then passes through the muffler systems so that the combustion noises
can be appropriately attenuated. The end result of all these processes is that the customer is
transported over land in a vehicle that does not produce unhealthy air quality.
Design Structure Matrix Analysis
A design structure matrix (DSM) is a tool that can be used to sequence tasks and processes in
order to more efficiently manage a project. This tool utilizes interdependencies between two
tasks to create groupings of tightly related tasks. Marks in the DSM represent interactions
between two processes or tasks. By reading across one task row, a mark in any of the boxes
signifies that information from other tasks is required to complete that one task. Marks in the
upper half of the DSM signify that information from tasks that have not been completed can
potentially cause rework to a previously completed task. Thus, an ideal DSM would be
lower triangular, meaning that all the marks in the matrix are below the diagonal. The lower
triangular matrix would also signify that the project does not contain any iterative processes.
The first step towards the creation of the catalytic converter DSM was the development of
the list of tasks required to complete the catalytic converter release process. In order to keep
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the DSM to a reasonable size, the system that was analyzed was just the catalytic converter
development process. Engine design and calibration development processes and steps were
not included in the matrix. At a high level, three categories of tasks were created- corporate
cycle planning, catalytic converter concept development, and program catalyst development.
In program management terms, these three phases could be called the planning stage, the
preprogram stage, and the program phase.
From the original list of tasks, interactions were then methodically and systematically
assigned to the matrix. The raw unpartitioned DSM matrix with the corresponding
interactions is shown in Appendix K. By using the partitioning algorithms contained within
Problematics Inc. software package entitled Problem Solving Matrix Version 32 (PSM32),
the tasks were reordered and partitioned to obtain a more optimum task sequence. The
partitioning algorithms work by mathematically determining the sequence of tasks that
produce the fewest number of off diagonal interaction with a specific emphasis placed on
reducing the number of interaction above the diagonal. When applied to the catalyst
internals and catalyst externals groups, an elegant decomposition results. Appendix L shows
the partitioned DSM matrix in detail, a smaller view of that same table is shown below.
Figure 28- Partitioned Design Structure Matrix
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The five groupings of tightly integrated tasks represent series of tasks that will require
iterations to arrive at an optimum solution. The first grouping of three tasks represent the
iterations that occur at a corporate level to develop a cycle plan that meets the federal
government's regulations for fleet average characteristics. The second grouping of tasks
relate to the iterations that occur when the catalyst internals group develops new technology
to meet the new federal regulations. The next small cluster of tasks illustrates the program
target setting process. The fourth series of grouped tasks refer to the iterations that occur as
program specific catalyst internal designs are developed to meet the vehicle specific targets.
The fifth and final grouping, consisting of work performed by the catalyst assembly
organization, depicts the iterative tasks required to create the detailed drawings of the
program specific catalyst assembly. This DSM further supports the idea that it is reasonable
to separate the catalyst internals organization and the catalyst assembly organization, because
the groupings of tasks performed by these two organizations are not inter-related.
The advantage of the DSM matrix, compared to a more traditional Gantt style project
management chart, is that the DSM matrix graphically illustrates the inherent iterations that
are present with complex system designs. In a Gantt style project chart, it is impossible to
decipher whether two tasks that contain overlapping durations need to be performed in
parallel, iteratively, or sequentially41 . This catalyst DSM matrix illustrates the magnitude of
the iterations and also exactly where the iterations exist
Chapter 5 Conclusions
In this chapter the history and development process of the catalytic converter were reviewed.
Important architecture downfalls, including, but not limited to, the architecture's reliance on
precious metals and the brittleness of the ceramic substrates, were discussed in detail. The
effects of these two major downfalls have been twofold. First off, the worldwide precious
metal demand in order to support the automobile industry has caused significant turmoil in
the precious metal market. Secondly, in order to overcome the problems brought about by
the brittleness of the ceramic substrates, complicated mounting technologies and canning
technologies have been developed. The most significant architecture limitation that exists
with today's three-way catalyst system is the time it takes for the substrates to achieve
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operational efficiency. When an automobile is first started, the traditional catalyst is
ineffective when operating below its light-off temperature, thus vehicle startup emissions
continue to be difficult to control. In order to manage the tailpipe emission certification
system, this chapter outlined how the functions and tasks could be decomposed into four
distinct groups: engine, calibration, catalyst assembly, and catalyst internals development.
The relationship and interdependencies of the tasks associated with the catalyst assembly and




Implementing new emission control technologies requires the creation of a system
architecture, the development of detailed engineering drawings, the verification of the
system, and the creation of a process to manufacture the system. This research investigated
each one of these four steps of the product development process with a specific purpose of
determining how each of those steps inhibited rapid development of new emission
technologies. This research has shown that engine architectures are the slowest evolving
architectures in the system. On average, Ford Motor Company's V8 engines have been in
production over 14 years. This is contrasted by Ford Motor Company's North American Car
platforms that have had a rolling average production history of 10 years since 1978.
This investigation has also uncovered the fact that the fastest clockspeeds operating within
the megasystem boundary are the changes in the governmental regulations and the
development clockspeed of bolt-on emission aftertreatment devices. In fact, the clockspeed
belonging to the bolt-on emission control device turns at exactly the same speed as the
clockspeed of the regulation industry. The entire megasystem could be represented as a
series of four gears arranged in series. In this analogy, a small spur gear, representing the
government regulation cycle, turns a larger spur gear representing the vehicle platform cycle.
The vehicle platform gear then meshes with a slightly larger engine development cycle gear.
The bolt-on after-treatment emission clockspeed, since it has to turn at the same rate as the
government regulation cycle can then be represented by a smaller spur gear meshed to the
very large engine development gear. This concept is shown in figure 29
Figure 29- System Clockspeed Representation
Government vehicle Engine Emission
Regulation Cycle Platform Cycle Architecture Cycle Aftertreatment Cycle
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A major force that has prevented the rapid implementation of hybrid and fuel cell powered
vehicles is that these alternative power plants tend to require substantial changes to the
vehicle platform architecture and also threaten the dominant engine architecture at the same
time. Unfortunately these two items are the worst items to drive change into because they
have the slowest clockspeed process which also means they are the most difficult and the
most expensive items in the system to change.
This research has also shown that the main drivers of the emission control development
process are regulations. It is the regulations that have forced the automakers and automotive
suppliers to develop new emission control technologies. The 1961 California mandate drove
PCV system development to be implemented in 1963 model year vehicles sold in California.
The 1965 Federal Motor Vehicle Control Act forced automobile manufacturers to reduce
hydrocarbon emissions and the industry responded by placing secondary air systems on
vehicles. The 1970 Federal Clean Air Act forced manufacturers to further clean up tailpipe
emissions and the automobile manufacturers responded with catalytic converter technology.
The chart below summarizes the technological complexity of the various engine emission
control devices that have been layered onto the basic four-stroke combustion engine
architecture. This thesis chose to examine the PCV system and the three-way catalytic
(TWC) converter system in detail because those two systems were at opposite ends of the
bolt on emissions device technological scale and thus they provided unique insights
regarding the difficulties of managing the technology development process and the
management of the interactions between those systems and other systems in the vehicle.







increasing System Complexity (# parts)
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When comparing the emission levels of today's automobiles with the emission levels from
the past, it is easy to conclude that society has made great progress. The reality of the
situation is that society has only successfully decreased mobile source emissions for certain
emission components that have been tracked and targeted for over 40 years. HC, CO and
NOx emissions, the three automotive emission constituents that have been tracked the
longest, show vast improvements between 1960 vehicle emission levels and 2004 vehicle
emission levels when measured on a per mile basis. Unfortunately, there is still one
constituent of automobile emissions that has escaped government regulation, and
unfortunately the total amount of that gas released into the air continues to increase. The
unmonitored emission that is being referred to is carbon dioxide. When carbon dioxide
becomes regulated, hopefully the industry insights that have been presented in this paper can
help the automobile industry quickly develop efficient and cost effective carbon dioxide
abatement technologies.
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Wilson / Davis Republican, Democrat
Davis Democrat
Bold print represents years that key policies were adopted by Federal and California legislation
California data from infospec available at www.infospec.com/Governors.html
Presidential data obtained from geocities at www.geocities.com/presfacts/general.html
66
Appendix
President of the United States
Name Political Party





















Nixon, Ford Republican, Republican
Ford Republican
Ford Republican
























Appendix B- Senate Majority Leaders and Speakers of the House


























































































































Bold print represents years that key policies were adopted by Federal legislation
Senate Majority leader data obtained from U.S. Senate information available at http://www.senate.gov



































































































Appendix C- Ford V8 Engine History
Ford Motor Company North American V-8 Car Engine Data
ngine Typ Engine Name Year Introduced Last Year in Production Displacement* Reign
V-8 Lincoln L-head 1921 1927 357.8
1927 1932 384.8 12





1949 1953 255 22
V8 Lincoln 1952 1954 317
1955 1955 341
1956 1957 368 6




1956 1960 312 11
V-8 M-E-L 1958 1960 383
1958 1958 410
1958 1965 430
1966 1968 462 11







1966 1968 428 11





1980 1982 255 35
V-8 335 Series 1970 1975 351C
1971 1982 400 13
V-8 385 Series 1968 1973 429
1968 1996 460 29
V-8 Modular 1991 2004 4.6L 2V
1993 2004 4.6L 4V 14
Tall Deck Modular 1997 2004 5.4L 2V
1999 2004 5.4L 4V 8
V-8 3.9L DOHC 2000 2004 3.9L 5
Average North American Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Edsel V8 engine production run (Running Average) 14.8
Pre 1946 data obtained from Hemmings Book of Prewar Fords
1946-1975 data obtained from American V8 Handbook
1975-2004 data obtained from Ward's Automotive Yearbooks and experience
1996-1999 3.5L V8 Taurus SHO excluded since Yamaha manufactured the engine
* Displacements in cubic inches unless otherwise noted
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Appendix D- General Motors Post War V8 Engine History
General Motors North American Post War V8 Engine History
Division Name DIsplacement Year Introduced Last Year Comment










ZR-i 5.71 1990 1995
LT-1 5.71 1992 1997




Vortec Big block 8.1L 2001 2004
W Series 348 1958 1961
409 1961 1965
427 1963 1963
Mark IV Big Block 396 1965 1969 Mark VI engines in
402 1969 1972 production till 2000
427 1966 1969
454 1970 1976

































Buick Big Block 400 1967 1969
430 1967 1969
455 1970 1976







Northstar / Aurora 4.61 1992 2004
4.01- 1995 2004
Compiled from data from the following sources:
Peter C. Sessler, Ultimate American V-8 Engine Data Book, MBI Publishing Company, 1999
http://www.442.com for Oldsmobile information
http://www.gm.com/automotive/gmpowertrain for 2004 model year information
http://www.hpsalvage.comltl.htm for LT1 and LS 1 model year information
Displacements in cubic inches unless otherwise noted
Bold numbers represent start and finish years for production
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Chrysler Corporation Postwar North American V8 History




































426 Hemi 1966 1971
4.7L 1999 2004
5.7 L 2004 2004
Data Obtained from the following sources:
Peter C. Sessler, Ultimate American V-8 Engine Data Book, MBI Publishing Company, 1999
http://www.allpar.com/mopar
http://www.fourforty.com/techstuff/440history.html
Displacements in cubic inches unless otherwise noted
Bold numbers represent start and finish years for production
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Appendix G- North American Engine Market Share Data
North American Produced Vehicle Sales by Engine Type
Model Year 4 Cylinder Production 6 Cylinder Production 8 Cylinder Production
1963 85,000 2681000 4574000
1964 1000 2454000 5436000
1965 500 2356000 6486000
1966 700 1854000 6751000
1967 600 1257000 6401000
1968 1000 1150000 7248000
1969 6100 931400 7539200
1970 2300 974000 6610000
1971 520000 880000 5781000
1972 851800 970100 7201000
1973 887900 1023700 8398700
1974 1058800 1558800 5719100
1975 565443 1254158 4828081
1976 869266 1762965 5813129
1977 599724 1708767 7215572
1978 939611 2211509 6102612
1979 1664756 2262087 5641420
1980 2308556 2682626 2358547
1981 2830848 2355493 1908517
1982 2363990 1735877 1615964
1983 2383342 1792125 1983039
1984 3919354 2334193 2447419
1985 3890518 2196801 2297418
1986 4396757 2465632 1758703
1987 4149400 2101545 1418926
1988 3749727 2591836 1326590
1989 3613461 2921522 1153232
1990 3206381 2638512 1059560
1991 3241545 2308867 887022
1992 2680346 2585746 952311
1993 3118897 2871037 812428
1994 3184927 2726964 936743
1995 3375886 3112733 999984
1996 3357539 2628823 796819
1997 3697751 2572960 738144
1998 3459499 2563084 604250
1999 3380719 3033433 666221
2000 3437150 3274182 688912
2001 3098855 2691613 572684
2002 2889465 2540838 477441
Data is a compilation of information obtained from the U.S. Car Production by Make,
Cylinder Type, and Displacement data section contained within Ward's Automotive
Yearbook for each model year that is referenced
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Appendix H- Platinum, Palladium and Rhodium Worldwide Usage Data
Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Data in ,000 OZ
Platinum
Autocatalyst: gross 360 490 455 630 900 680 640 655 645 840 980 1,145 1,255 1,315 1,455
recovery 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 -30 -45 -70 -95 -115 -160 -175
Total Demand 2,600 2430 2,700 2,820 2,880 2,360 2,460 2,350 2,200 2,660 2,860 2,880 3,320 3,650 3,470
Paladium
Autocatalyst: gross 300 270 290 300 340 320 265 270 260 265
recovery 0 0 0 0 -20 -30 -40 -50 -65 -70
Total Demand 2,030 2,090 2,270 2,700 2,960 2,740 2,910 3,185 3,335 3,340
Rhodium
Autocatalyst: gross 135 188 226 232 264
recovery 0 0 -3 -7 -7
Total Demand 244 268 296 304 327
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Data in ,000 OZ
Platinum
Autocatalyst: gross 1,535 1,565 1,550 1,685 1,870 1,850 1,880 1,830 1,800 1,610 1,890 2,520 2,640 3,180
recovery -210 -205 -230 -255 -290 -320 -350 -370 -405 -420 -470 -530 -570 -650
Total Demand 3,705 4,050 3,815 4,065 4,580 4,840 4,960 5,130 5,370 5,590 5,680 6,230 6,560 6,590
Paladium
Autocatalyst: gross 315 355 490 705 975 1,800 2,360 3,200 4,890 5,880 5,640 5,090 3,090 3,670
recovery -85 -85 -95 -100 -105 -110 -145 -160 -175 -195 -230 -280 -370 -410
Total Demand 3,415 3,790 3,890 4,265 4,870 6,120 6,150 7,580 8.600 9,370 8,960 6.750 4,850 5,650
Rhodium
Autocatalyst: gross 334 301 305 356 379 464 424 418 483 509 793 566 609 673
recovery -13 -16 -22 -25 -34 -37 -45 -49 -57 -65 -79 -88 -99 -120
Total Demand 391 346 328 366 388 474 471 467 507 528 812 579 604 641
Year 1976 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
% Worldwide Demand of
Platinum Used for Automobile 13.85 20.16 16.85 22.34 31.25 28.81 26.02 27.45 27.95 29.89 31.82 36.46 34.34 31.64 36.89
Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand of
Palladium Used for Automobile 14.78 12.92 12.78 11.11 10.81 10.58 7.73 6.91 5.85 5.84
Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand of
Rhodium Used for Automobile 55.33 70.15 75.34 74.01 78.59
Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand for
PlatinumObtainedfrom 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.36 1.69 2.45 3.30 346 4.38 5.04
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand for
Palladium Obtained from 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.09 1.37 1.57 1.95 2.10
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand for
Rhodium Obtained from 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 2.30 2.14
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1
% Worldwide Demand of
Platinum Used for Automobile
Catalysts
35.76 33.58 34.60 35.18 34.50 31.61 30.85 28.46 25.98 21.29 25.00 31.94 31.55 38.39
% Worldwide Demand of
Palladium Used for Automobile 6.73 7.12 10.15 14.19 17.86 27.61 36.02 40.11 54.83 60.67 60.38 71.26 56.08 57.70
Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand of
Rhodium Used for Automobile 82.10 82.37 86.28 90.44 88.92 90.08 80.47 79.01 84.02 84.09 87.93 82.56 84.44 86.27
Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand for
Platinum Obtained from
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
5.67 5.06 6.03 6.27 6.33 6.61 7.06 7.21 7.54 7.51 8.27 8.51 8.69 9.86
% Worldwide Demand for
Palladium Obtained from 2.49 2.24 2.44 2.34 2.16 1.80 2.36 2.11 2.03 2.08 2.57 4.15 7.63 7.26
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
% Worldwide Demand for
Rhodium Obtained from
Recycled Automobile Catalysts
3.32 4.62 6.71 6.83 8.76 7.81 9.55 10.49 11.24 12.31 9.73 15.20 16.39 18.72
Data obtained from Johnson Mathey Corporation. Data is available from their Platinum Today website at the
following address: http://www.platinum.matthey.com/market-data/1046092226.html
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Appendix I- Precious Metal Obtained From Recycled Automobile Catalysts
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- Rhodium
- - - Platinum
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3 Deflator from Energy Commission's Demand Analysis Office recalculated for 2003 prices. Obtained from
http://www.energy.ca.gov/gasoline/statistics/gasoline-cpi-adjusted.html
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Appendix K- Unpartitioned Design Structure Matrix
Tasks
1 Government Emission Regulation Final Ruling
2 Cycle plan developed for emission compliance
3 Cycle plan developed for powertrain
4 Cycle plan developed for vehicles
5 Concept NOx emission target setting
6 Concept Hydrocarbon emission target setting
7 Concept CO emission target setting
8 Concept powertrain selection
9 Concept substrate development
10 Concept washcoat development
11 Concept Analytical study of system emissions
12 Concept hardware provout
13 Concept assessment of status to target
14 Implementation readiness of concept technology declared
15 Program emission targets established
16 Program powerloss targets selected
17 Program powertrain selected
18 Program substrate volume determination
19 Program substrate contour selection
20 Program substrate length selection
21 Program substrate wall thickness determination
22 Program washcoat technology selection
23 Program manifold pierce point determination
24 Program inlet pipe design
25 Program sensor placement determination
26 Program inlet cone geometry
27 Program outlet cone geometry
28 Program substrate flow velocity profile determination
29 Program substrate brick utilization determination
30 Program catalyst outlet flange selection
31 Program catalyst inlet flange selection
32 Program substrate mounting selection
33 Program catalyst can to gap selection
34 Program catalyst outlet pipe routing
35 Program catalyst seal selection
36 Program catalyst assembly structural verification
37 Program catalyst internals verification
38 Program precious metal loading determination
39 Program design complete / Comply with emissions regulations
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0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 000 000
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